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AN IRS DUTY OF CONSISTENCY:
THE FAILURE OF COMMON LAW MAKING ANT)
A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
STEVE R. JoHNsoN*
The IRS shouldendeavor to treatsimilarly-situatedtaxpayerssimilarly, but
does this aspirationrise to the level oaajudiciallyenforceable duty? If the IRS
takes a position on Taxpayer B that is correct under the law but is inconsistent
with aposition the IRS took on similarly-situatedTaxpayerA, should the IRS's
position on Taxpayer B fail simply because of the inconsistency? These
questions implicate important themes, such as fairness, the rule of law,
separation of powers, administrative exigencies, the role of common law
making in a highly positivisticsystem, and the sustainabilityof legal regimes.
A constitutional standardapplies to the most egregious cases, but the
overwhelming majority of cases present subconstitutional, rather than
constitutional, issues. Since there is no controlling statute, these issues have
been addressedas a matter of common law. Unfortunately, this exercise in
common law making has failedbadly. Despite over halfa century of decisions,
there is no settled rule. Judicial inconsistency has been the response to IRS
inconsistenc-atleast six different approaches have been suggested by courts
and commentators. There is no perceptible movement towards coalescence
around any of these approaches, andfew cases have undertaken a searching
examination of the variety of views, the main precedents, and the powerful
conflicting values at issue.
Given the failure of common law making in this area, this article argues
that a statutory solution is necessary. Crafting the solution is challenging,
however, due to a clash between the head and the heart. Viewed solely as a
matter of legal doctrine, the right answer is that there should be no judicially
enforceable duty of tax consistency on the Government. This answer is
supported by a number of compelling rationales based on the separation of
powers principle and the exigencies of administering a tax system involving
billions ofpoints of contact between taxpayers and the IRS.
On the other hand, the cold logic of those rationalesdoes not satisfy our
cherished and deeply held notions of fairness. Considering the claims of
justice, it would be unrealistic to believe thatjudges and legislators could
muster the intellectual discipline to adhere over the long term to a "no
judicially enforceable duty of consistency"'position.
Thus, the challenge is to achieve a solution that balances the needs of the
system with the needs of the conscience in ways that are both sound and
* E.L. Wiegand Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law. The author can be
reached at steve.johnson@unlv.edu. The author is grateful to the faculties of the Boyd School of
Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, and University of San Francisco School of Law
for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
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sustainable. This articleproposes to achieve this delicate balanceby amending
the Internal Revenue Code to permit abatement of interest on tax
understatements-butnot abatement ofthe understatementsthemselves-when
the taxpayer reliedon a high-level Treasury or IRS interpretationthat the IRS
later disregarded
In many cases, interest is a substantialcomponent of the total tax liability.
Accordingly, excusing the taxpayer from interest liability would both
meaningfully benefit the taxpayer and meaningfully punish the IRS for its
inconsistency. However, the requirement of reliance and the fact that the
taxpayer would not be relieved of the underlying deficiency would prevent
windfalls andpreserve the substantiveliabilityrules enactedby Congress. An
approachthatprovides meaningful correction, but not overcorrection,would
produce the least harmn to tax administrationand offer the best prospectsfor
sustainability.As an additionalbenefit, the proposalbuilds on statutorytrends
regarding interest liability on tax underpayments.
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1.INTRODUCTION
The IRS strives for positional consistency, and substantial coordination and
review mechanisms are in place to foster this objective! Nonetheless, the IRS
sometimes takes a position that is less favorable to a taxpayer than the position
the IRS previously took with a similarly-situated taxpayer. Conflicting values
then come into play in deciding whether and how to address these
inconsistencies.

1. IRS initiatives to enhance consistency of issue resolution include the Coordinated
Examination Program, Industry Specialization Program, Market Segment Specialization
Program, Industry Issue Focus Program, and Appeals Coordinated Issue Program. See, e.g.,
DAviDM. RICHARDSON, JEROME BoiSON &STEvE JOHNSON, CiviLTAX PROCEDuRE 100, 130
(2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter RICHARDSON, BoiusoN & JOHNSON]; Scott E. Powers & James E.
Brennan, IRS Launches New Industry Issue Focus Strategy, TAX ADvisER, July 2007, at 410.
Similarly, the IRS attempts through its Office of Servicewide Penalties to improve consistency
in the assertion of tax penalties. But see U.S. GOVT AccouNTABn~rry OFFICE, GAO-09-567,
TAx ADMINISTRATION: IRS SHOULD EVALUATE PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN To Focus IT'S
EfFORTS (June 2009) (challenging the effectiveness of the IRS's penalty coordination efforts
and suggesting the creation of a focused plan).
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For example, assume that Adam and Eve engage in essentially identical
transactions that they report identically on their separate federal tax returns. The
IRS accepts Adam's reporting of the transaction; however, it later challenges
Eve's identical reporting and determines that Eve owes a significant amount of
additional taxes.
This example is an easy case if the courts determine that the IRS's position
and,
for Eve is incorrect under the substantive law. The IRS will lose the case
2
after judicial review, the tax system will treat Adam and Eve equally.
The matter becomes thornier if the reviewing court concludes that the
IRS's position on Eve was a proper application of the substantive law. Then, a
choice must be made between consistency and correctness. If, in Eve's case, the
court disregards the inconsistency and holds for the IRS, Eve will pay the
"6correct" amount of tax. However, Adam and Eve will have been treated
differently by the tax system-Adam more favorably, Eve less favorablydespite the fact that they engaged in identical transactions and reported them
identically. If, on the other hand, the court holds for Eve on consistency
grounds, the tax system will have treated Adam and Eve identically, but at the
alone--receiving the benefit of
price of both Adam and Eve-not just Adam
3
the IRS's error and underpaying their taxes.
Part 11 of this article indexes the significance and persistence of the
controversy for a judicially enforceable duty of consistency on the IRS.
Treasury and IRS positions take many forms, differing in formality, status, and
degree of administrative review. These differences are significant in comparing
the competing approaches to consistency. Thus, Part II describes the different
types of tax guidance and positions that emanate from both Treasury and the
IRS.
Part Ill explores the constitutional, statutory, and case law dimensions of
the consistency controversy. Constitutional responses apply to only a few
2. Eve, of course, will have been forced to pay litigation expenses that Adam didn't, but
that disparity may be mitigated by I.R.C. § 7430. That section permits taxpayers to recover
administrative and litigation costs from the IRS under certain conditions, one of which is when
the IRS's position was not "substantially justified." I.R.C. § 7430(a), (c)(4)(B) (2006). The
IRS's inconsistency would help Eve make the case that this condition was satisfied. See I.R.C. §
7430(c)(4)(B)(ii). The possibility that Eve could deduct her expenses in contesting the IRS's
position under I.R.C. § 212(3) also might mitigate the disparity.
3. This example involves the IRS treating two taxpayers differently who engaged in
essentially identical transactions. Inconsistency for the same taxpayer also can occur. For
example, Adam engages in a transaction in Tax Year I and claims a deduction, which the IRS
accepts. Then, in Tax Year 2, Adam engages in an identical transaction and again claims a
deduction. This time, however, the IRS disallows the claimed deduction. This illustrates the
axiom that each tax year stands on its own. E.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
Thus, courts usually allow the IRS to take later-year positions inconsistent with prior-year
positions for the same taxpayer. But see Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th
Cir. 1938); Eichelberger & Co. v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1937) (both suggesting
that the IRS has a duty to treat particular taxpayers consistently over time under certain
circumstances).
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instances of the most egregious IRS inconsistencies. Thus, the most important
issues are subconstitutional. Because no current statute controls, consistency
questions are under the domain of case law. Unfortunately, the result of
common law making4 has been doctrinal chaos. Multiple views have emerged
from inadequately reasoned cases. Some cases find no judicially enforceable
consistency duty on the IRS, whereas some say there is one. Still, other cases,
as well as commentary and IRS guidance, take various intermediate positions.
Part IV evaluates these competing views. It acknowledges that there are
strong arguments, based principally on fairness and rule of law values,
supporting an enforceable duty of consistency. Nonetheless, Part IV maintains
that the arguments against this duty-mainly separation of powers and
administrability concemns-are even more powerful. In addition, no
intermediate view adequately balances the relevant considerations.
Accordingly, Part IV contends that, from a purely doctrinal standpoint, the best
view is that there should be no judicially enforceable duty of consistency on the
IRS.
Part V bows to reality. The theoretically superior "no enforceable duty"
view is unlikely to be installed and maintained over the long term, certainly not
in a context that continues to rely on case-by-case decision making. Because
different judges inevitably weigh the values differently, none of the competing
views is likely ever to become settled doctrine. Indeed, far from the consistency
doctrine coalescing as decisions have multiplied, there is now more divergence
of thought regarding IRS consistency than ever before. In particular, doctrinal
arguments lack the power to fully escape the gravitational pull of fairness.
Thus, although theoretically superior, the absolute "no duty" view is unlikely to
be sustainable over the long term. We must seek a solution to the consistency
dilemma in a new and more balanced approach.
Part VI proposes this approach. Due to the manifest failure of common law
making in this area, the solution must be statutory. The solution also must have
enough force to meaningfully punish the IRS for its inconsistency and
meaningfully help wronged taxpayers-only such an approach can satisfy the
demands of fairness enough to be sustainable. And yet, the solution must not
have so much force that it confers windfalls on taxpayers or undercuts effective
tax administration.
The approach in Part VI sufficiently satisfies these criteria. Under an
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, relief would be available to
taxpayers who show that they relied on high-level Treasury or IRS positionsregulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, or notices-which the IRS
4. This article will borrow the definition of "federal common law" from previous
articles. "'[Flederal common law' . .. refer[s] to any rule of federal law created by a cort...
when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments--constitutional or
-congressional." Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HLAiv. L. REv. 881, 890 (1986) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of FederalCourts, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 5 (1985) (defining
"federal common law" similarly).
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later contradicted or disregarded. These taxpayers would be relieved of interest
liability on their tax deficiencies, but not of liability for the deficiencies
themselves. Because interest is a large component of total tax liabilities in most
cases, this measure would both significantly punish the IRS and significantly
help deserving taxpayers. However, because relief would depend on proof of
reliance and because liabilities for the underlying deficiencies would not be
erased, the measure would avoid windfalls and preserve essential aspects of tax
administration. Furthermore, the proposed solution comports with trends of the
Internal Revenue Code's treatment of interest on tax understatements.
11. THE CONSISTENCY CONTROVERSY
A. The Persistence and Signi~ficance of the Controversy

It is impossible to know how often the IRS takes inconsistent positions.
Most transactions between taxpayers and the IRS are subject to privacy rules
and do not become matters of public record.' Furthermore, given the sheer
volume of interactions between taxpayers and the IRS, "perfection in the
administration of such vast responsibilities cannot be expected. " 6 Nonetheless,
it is clear that inconsistencies occur often enough to constitute a substantial
problem. One of the leading administrative law scholars of a prior generation
remarked on this reality:
Of all the agencies of the government, the worst offender against sound
principles in the use of precedents may be the Internal Revenue Service.
Its basic attitude is that because consistency is impossible, an effort to be
consistent is unnecessary; therefore it need not consider precedents, and it
may depart from precedents without explaining why.7
..

The consistency issue has been litigated for generations,8 and as shown by
the numerous cases cited in this article, it has been litigated frequently.
5. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2006).
6. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r, 509 F.2d 1220, 1222 (2d Cir. 1975). A non-tax
opinion agreed: "The variety of problems dealt with [by agencies] make absolute consistency,
perfect symmetry, impossible. And the law reflects its good sense by not exacting it." Mary
Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cit. 1964) (Brown, J., specially concurring),
rev'don other grounds, 382 U.S. 46 (1965). However, the opinion went further: "[L]aw does
not permit an agency to grant to one person the right to do that which it denies to another
similarly situated. There may not be a rule for Monday, another for Tuesday, a rule for general
application, but denied outright in a specific case." Id.

7. 2

KENET

Cuup DAvis,

ADmiNISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE

§ 8:12 (2d ed. 1979).

Professor Davis, in his capacity as a taxpayer, lost cases against the IRS. See infra text
accompanying notes 124-28.
8. See, e.g., Orange Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1942); Can. Dry
Bottling Co. of Fla. v. FAHS, 109 F. Supp. 187, 192 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
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Presumably, many more consistency questions arise in cases that do not result
in published opinions. 9
Despite the abundance of litigation, there is no settled rule regarding IRS
inconsistency. For example, a recent case involved conflicting complex IRS
regulations on transfer pricing among related companies.' 0 Application of the
general standard favored the taxpayer, while application of a more
transactionally specific rule favored the IRS." In the circuit court's original
disposition of the case, the dissenting judge raised the possibility (but
ultimatel,' did not urge) that the taxpayer could prevail on consistency-related
grounds. The majority, however, eschewed this approach, holding for the IRS
on the basis of the constructional canon that, in cases of conflict, a specific
provision trumps a more general provision. 1
The persistency and difficulty of this issue was demonstrated by a wellpublicized but ultimately unsuccessful effort by a former Chief Counsel of the
IRS to curb ? ositional inconsistency. In 2002, responding to criticism in a tax
court case,' then IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams issued a notice
instructing IRS attorneys never to argue that the IRS is not bound by its own
rulings. 15 It is not clear whether Government lawyers always followed the
notice even during Williams' tenure. In any event, Williams resigned not long
thereafter.'16 The notice has been largely inoperative since then, as evidenced by
the fact that consistency litigation has continued since 2002 .17
9. For example, one commentator identified consistency controversies involving three
large corporations-GlaxoSmithKine, Black & Decker, and Bristol-Myers Barceloneta-which
have been resolved without judicial opinions. Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal
Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. GIN. L.
Rnv. 531, 532-34 (2005).
10. Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r, 567 F.3d 482, 486-88 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'g 125 T.C. 37
(2005); id at 497 (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has issued
regulations that are irreconcilable."). Ultimately, however, the circuit court withdrew its original
decision and issued a new decision affirming the Tax Court. Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm'r, 598 F.3d
1191 (9th Cir. 20 10).
11. Xilinx, 567 F.3d at 485-88 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 497 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (stating that one decisional alternative would be to
"[h]old that when the Commissioner talks out of both sides of his mouth, his speech is
unintelligible and his regulations are unenforceable").
13. Id. at 496 (majority opinion). The circuit court's ultimate decision in the case,
however, rejected the "specific controls over general" canon and resolved the ambiguity based
on the perceived dominant purpose of the regulations. Xilinx, 598 F.3d at 1196.
14. Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 168-73 (2002). In Rauenhorst, the court cited
Phillips v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 529, 534 (1987), a strong pro-consistency opinion written by B.
John Williams when he was a tax court judge before becoming IRS Chief Counsel.
15. See Sheryl Stratton, IRS Litigators Bound by IRS Rulings, Chief Counsel Says, 97
TAx NoTEs, Oct. 28, 2002, at 460, 460.
16. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Ernst & Young to Pay US. $15 Million in Tax Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2003, at Cl1.
17. See, e.g., Temple v. Comm'r, 62 F. App'x 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
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The frequency with which consistency questions have been addressed in
commentary also underscores the importance of the issue. Articles on the
subject by academics, tax administrators, and tax practitioners go back several9
generations,'18 and the topic is now more popular than ever before.'
Unfortunately, the solutions offered in the commentary thus far do not suitably
balance the many dimensions of this complex area.
B. Types of Treasury and IRS Pronouncements

Not all utterances and actions by personnel of the Treasury Department or
the IRS are of equal weight. Some are subject to elaborate, multi-level reviews
before issuance, while others are reviewed with less scrutiny or none at all.
Some require approval by top agency officials, while others do not, and some
are definitive, while others are only suggestive .20 As will be developed in Part
IV, these differences matter for consistency purposes. The argument for holding
the IRS accountable to a duty of consistency is stronger when it pertains to
high-level actions as opposed to low-level guidance. To lay a foundation for
that discussion, here are brief descriptions of the modalities through which
Treasury and the IRS take positions on tax issues. 21 They include the following:
(1) Treasury regulations: Regulations are issued by Treasury after
extensive review within both Treasury and the IRS. 2 They are the highest

duty of consistency applies only to the taxpayer and not to the IRS); Fears v. Comm'r, 97
T.C.M. (CCH) 1317, 1319 (2009); Rowe v. Comin'r, 128 T.C. 13, 20-26 (2007) (Gale, J.,
concurring) (stating that petitioner should be able to rely on a previous ruling); Oman v.
Comm'r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 372 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue

Service: A Statement of Principles,20th N.Y.U.

ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx'N.

1, 17-32 (1962);

Theodore S. Lynn & Mervyn S. Gerson, Quasi-Estoppeland Abuse of Discretion as Applied
Against the United States in FederalTax Controversies, 19 TAX L. REV. 487 (1964); Samuel J.
Winer, Case Comment, New Limitations on the Scope of Discretion of the Commissioner of
InternalRevenue, 54 B.U. L. REv. 425 (1974); Walter B. Melton & Yale F. Goldberg, Equitable
Estoppel in Tax Administration, TAXES, Feb. 1984, at 77.
19. See, e.g., Are There Any Private Remediesfor Inconsistent Treatment of Similarly
SituatedTaxpayers?, 991J. TAX'N 252 (2003); Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrngton, Is
the Internal Revenue Service Bound by Its Own Regulations andRulings?, 51 TAx LAW. 675
(Summer 1998); Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin ofLittle Minds No More: JusticeRequires an IRS
Duty of Consistency, 2006 UTAH- L. REV. 317; Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 9.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 2 1-50.
21. For more detailed discussion, see RICHARDSON, BoRisoN & JOHNSON, supra note 1,at
16-23; Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R 's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century. A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REv. 323
(2008); Mitchell Rogovin, The FourR 's:Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity:A
View from Within, 43 TAXES 756 (1965).
22. See GAIL LEVIN RicHVoND, FEDERAL TAx RESEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND
TECHNIQUES 128-29 (7th ed. 2007).

2010]
AN IRS DUTY OF CONSISTENCY57

20101

571

positions in tax,2 and, in general, they have
authorities among administrative
24
"force of law" status.
(2) Revenue rulings, revenue procedures, andIRS notices: Revenue
rulings are second in weight to regulations and they receive substantial
administrative review 2 The IRS states that revenue rulings have less weight
than regulations but nonetheless may be used as precedents by taxpayers.2 In
theory, revenue rulings address matters of substance, while revenue procedures
deal solely with matters of procedure.2 However, revenue procedures do
soniletimes concern substance .28 The IRS views its notices as equivalent in
stature to revenue rulings and revenue procedures.2
(3) IRS announcements: Announcements are issued by the IRS to
inform the public about actions or positions that the IRS intends to take in
less formal than revenue rulings, revenue
future cases .30 They "are somewhat
3
procedures, and notices.,, '
(4) InternalIRS guidance: The IRS Chief Counsel's Office-and to a
lesser extent other IRS offices-issue guidance intended only for other IRS
functions and not for persons outside the agency. 3 2 Such guidance takes a
variety of forms, including general counsel memoranda, field service and other
advisories, and the Internal Revenue Manual.3
(5) IRS rulings on tax issues to particular taxpayers: Taxpayers
seeking additional comfort for the proper reporting of their transactions may
submit a private letter ruling request to the IRS . 3 A favorable response from
the IRS binds the IRS, but only for that taxpayer.3 5 Letter rulings may not be
relied upon or cited as precedents by other taxpayers. 3 6 Determination letters
are requested by taxpayers regarding their qualification for tax-exempt or other
favored statuses.3 Technical advice memoranda are requested from the
National Office by IRS personnel for complex legal issues during audits and
administrative appeals regarding particular taxpayers' returns .3 ' Like private
23.
24.

See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
See infra text accompanying notes 323-42.

25.

WILLIAm

A.

RAABE, GERALD

E.

WHInrENBuRG & DEBRA L. SANDERS, FEDERAL TAX

26.

121-22 (7th ed. 2006).
Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (as amended in 2002); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B.

27.
28.
29.

See RAABE, supra note 25, at 121, 124.
See, e.g., RICHmoND, supra note 22, at 157.
Rev. Rul. 87-138, 1987-2 C.B. 287.

RESEARCH

814.

30. See RAAE, supranote 25, at 121, 132.
31. RICHMOND, supra note 22, at 158.
32. See RAABE, supra note 25, at 121, 132-33.
33. See id.
34. See id at 126.
35. See id. at 127.
36. I.R.C. § 611 0(k)(3) (2006).
37. See RAABE, supra note 25, at 128.
38. See id. at 127.
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letter rulings, they are directed to the particular situation and are not
precedential.3
(6) Expressions of agreement or disagreement with court decisions:
When the IRS loses a significant court case, it evaluates the outcome. It may
agree or disagree with the decision, and it sometimes publishes its view of the
case in mediums such as acquiescences, nonacquiescences, and actions on
decisions .4 0 These publications are indicators of whether the IRS is likely to
continue to litigate similar cases in the future.4
(7) Oral and written return preparationguidance: In addition to
private letter rulings, the IRS provides extensive guidance to taxpayers
preparing their returns. This guidance includes instructions for IRS forms,
numerous publications on topics of frequent importance, and answers by
taxpayer service representatives to telephonic inquiries.4 Sometimes, this
advice is misleading or simply wrong,4 and it is clear that these errors do not
absolve taxpayers of the liabilities they are subject to under the law."4
(8) Positions taken on an audit: The IRS takes substantive positions in
auditing taxpayers' returns. The overwhelming majority of returns are not
audited at all, and, when audit occurs, it usually is confined to a few return
items, rather than all or most line items . 45 An unaudited issue has no estoppel
46
effect.
(9) Positions taken in briefs or oral arguments during litigation: The
positions taken in briefs and oral arguments in important cases may reflect
considerable thought, review, and coordination. Generally, in administrative
law cases, the courts have steered an uneven course on the degree of deference
accorded to agency positions expressed in briefs and oral arguments. Some

cases treat them deferentially; 47 others do

not. 48

39.
40.

Id
Id at 130.

41.

See, e.g., Is It EverReally Safe to Rely on IRS Acquiescences?, 106J. TAX'N 254, 254

(2007).

42. See Raabe, supra note 25.
43. See id
44. I.R.C. Proc. § 601.201(k)(2) (as amended in 2002).
45.

See infra text accompanying notes 203-05. This is true even for large corporations
BoRisoN & JOHNSON, supranote

under Limited Issue Focused Examinations. See RicHARDSON,
1, at 100.

46. E.g., Wagner v. United States, 387 F.2d 966, 972 (Ct. CI. 1967).
47. E.g., Kennedy v. Plan Admn'r for DuPont Sax'. &Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 872-73 n.7
(2009); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007) (citing Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
48. E.g., Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th
Cir. 2001); cf Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law--do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.").
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(10)
Settlements reachedby the IRS or the DepartmentofJustice in
controverted cases:49 Parties, including the Government, are driven by
numerous considerations in deciding how to settle cases. Not all of those
considerations reflect the perceived merits of the issues. Accordingly, courts
typically hold that other parties cannot demand identical terms to those on
which the Government settled other, similar cases. 50
One of several key questions in defining the contours of any IRS duty of
consistency: Which of the above would be triggers for application of the duty?
Establishing only high-level Treasury and IRS positions as triggers would limit
the scope of the duty, whereas making all or most Treasury and IRS positions
consistency triggers would escalate the risk of excessive interference with tax
administration. Regrettably, proponents of consistency duties do not always
clearly address this question. This will be further explored in Parts IV and VI of
this article.
IlI. CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND CASE LAW
DIMENSIONS
A constitutional standard applies to the most egregious cases. These cases
are rare, however, so the subconstitutional dimension is of principal
significance. No current statute provides an anchor for a general consistency
duty. Thus, consistency questions have been relegated to resolution under
federal common law making.
Unfortunately, no settled rule has emerged from this approach. Numerous
cases have espoused a "no duty" view, that is, that there is no judicially
enforceable obligation on the IRS to treat similarly-situated taxpayers
similarly. 5 ' Indeed, for a number of decades, the "no duty" view predominated.
49. The IRS Chief Counsel's Office represents the IRS in tax court, while the Department
of Justice represents the IRS in allI other courts. See United States Department of the Treasury,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/general-counsel/chief-counselirs.shtmhl. The Justice Department
and the IRS coordinate closely, but they occasionally disagree. E.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 59
T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the IRS Chief
Counsel's Office won the case in the tax court; on appeal, Justice renounced the successful
theory below, offered a different theory, and lost). When they do disagree, Justice has the final
call in cases that have been referred to it. See I.R.C. § 7122(a) (2006) (terminating the IRS's
ability to settle a civil or criminal case once it has been referred to Justice for prosecution or
defense).
50. E.g., Buncev. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 500, 510-11 (1993), afid per curiam, 26
F.3d 138 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fears v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1317, 1319 (2009); see also
Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-88, 2008 WL 4865566, at
*2-.3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2008) (upholding the confidentiality of IRS settlements in part
because of Fed. R. Evid. 408, which renders compromises, offers to compromise, and statements
and conduct incident to settlement negotiations as inadmissible evidence).
51. "No duty" is convenient shorthand, but it is a bit imprecise. Even if consistency is not
judicially enforceable, it should remain an administrative priority, which the IRS should attempt
to advance through internal review processes.
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Yet, there also are numerous cases supporting the contrary "strong duty" view,
that is, that IRS inconsistency is a basis on which the courts can resolve a case
adversely to the IRS, exonerating the taxpayer from liability of any sort
(deficiency, interest, and penalties) with respect to the pertinent issue. The
"strong duty" view appears to have somewhat increased its sway in recent
years.
Like well-matched and resilient opponents, neither the "no duty" nor the
"strong duty" view has gained clear ascendancy. This stalemate has created a
partial vacuum, allowing other views to enter. These additional views are
intermediates between the "no duty" and "strong duty" positions. As such, they
may be called "weak duty" views because, compared to the "strong duty"
position, they either operate less frequently or impose on the IRS a sanction
smaller than the loss of the entire case. A variety of "weak duty" views have
been suggested by cases and commentary.
A. ConstitutionalDimensions
The Equal Protection and Due Process components of the Fifth
Amendment bear on governmental consistency. The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment acts as a shield for taxpayers, which is evident in its
purpose:
SThe purpose of the equal protection clause .., is to secure every person
within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents.... [However,] mere errors ofjudgment by
officials will not support a claim of discrimination. There must be something
more-something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the
essential principle of practical uniformity. The good faith ofsuch officers and

the validity of their actions are Pfresumed; when assailed, the burden of proof
is upon the complaining party.
The number of persons in a class is immaterial for equal protection
purposes."3 A successful equal protection claim may be brought by a "class of
one" if that one was "intentionally treated differently from others similarly
4
situated ... [without a] rational basis for the difference in treatment.",1
Equal Protection and Due Process interrelate in ways that defy easy
characterization. The concepts are neither "mutually exclusive" nor "always
interchangeable[];"55 however, they both "stem[] from our American ideal of

52. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Twp. of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350,352-53 (1918) (noting the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to state property tax assessments).
53. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).
5 4. Id.
55. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
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fairness," and "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due

process.",56

58dfnanshv

In both tax5 and non-tax criminal prosecutions,sdenatshv
sometimes complained of selective prosecution in violation of Fifth
Amendment guarantees. These claims are subject to a high standard and rarely
succeed. 59 The defendant must satisfy the following burden:
In order to make out a claim of selective prosecution the defendant must
show: first, that others similarly situated generally have not been prosecuted;
and second, that the Government's prosecution of him is selective, invidious,
in bad faith or based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion,
or his exercise of constitutional rights.60
This standard has been borrowed from the criminal context and applied to
selective enforcement challenges to civil determinations by the IRS.
Thus, although IRS inconsistency can be challenged on constitutional
grounds, these challenges are subject to a demanding standard and are unlikely

56. Id.
57. E.g., United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Malmnowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860
(3d Cir. 1973); see Steve R. Johnson, The Selective Enforcement Defense in Civil andCriminal

Tax Cases, A.B.A.

SEC. OF TAx'N

NEWS Q., Winter 2008, at 14, 14.

58. E.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (stating that mere "conscious exercise
of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation"); United
States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, The Right to
NondiscriminatoryEnforcement of State PenalLaws, 61 CoLuM. L. REv. 1103(1961) (arguing
that evidentiary and policy issues have allowed continued discriminatory enforcement of laws).
59. See sources cited supra notes 57-58.
60. United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. Penn-Field Indus. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 720, 723 (1980) (the key case); see also Estate
of Campion v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 165, 170 (1998), afdsub nom. Tucek v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d
259 (10Oth Cir. 1999), and afd sub nom. Drake Oil Tech. Partners v. Comm'r, 211 F.3d 1277
(10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the IRS is not required to offer the same settlement terms to
similarly situated taxpayers absent proof of "disparate treatment based on impermissible
considerations" and contractual agreements to the contrary); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Comm'r, 104
T.C. 13, 58-59, supplemented by 104 T.C. 417 (1995) (holding that the IRS is not required to
offer the same settlement in this situation as offered to another taxpayer); Fresoli v. Comm'r, 55
T.C.M. (CCH) 1624, 1626 (1988) (finding no evidence of offers being based upon
impermissible considerations or arbitrary classification); Avers v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH)
678, 693 (1988) (taxpayer must demonstrate that "discriminatory selection was based on
impermissible considerations or an arbitrary classification"); Davis v. Coinm'r (Davis 1), 65
T.C. 1014, 1022 (1976) (treatment of other taxpayers is irrelevant in determining liability of

taxpayer).
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to succeed.62 Therefore, the key questions center on the possible existence and
contours of a subconstitutional duty of consistency on the IRS.
B. Statutory Dimensions
A few tax statutes address consistency in very limited circumstances.
However, there currently is no comprehensive statutory answer to the
consistency controversy. Below, candidate statutes within and outside the
Internal Revenue Code are examined, and found wanting.
1. Tax Statutes
Only one tax statute-§ 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code-has been
suggested as a general anchor for an IRS duty of consistency. The question of
when Treasury regulations and IRS rulings may be applied retroactively has
garnered considerable attention over the decades. 6 For many years, the
governing statute was former § 7805(b): "The Secretary [of the Treasury or his
delegate] may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation,
relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive
effect."66
In 1996, the section was significantly revised.67 Now, § 7805(b)(l)-(7)
provides that, with stated exceptions, tax regulations typically are effective only
prospectively.68 The essence of the pre-1996 provision survives for rulings,
however, under current § 7805(b)(8). 69 Section 7805(b)(8) provides that the
IRS "may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling .. . relatin to the
internal revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect." This
62. This is as it should be. Statutory, not constitutional, law should generally provide the
framework for resolving tax administration controversies.
63. Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, references to the duty of consistency in the
text are to a subconstitutional duty.
64. E.g., I.R.C. § 6224(c)(2) (2006) (allowing taxpayers to receive settlements of certain
partnership issues consistent with settlements received by other partners).
65. E.g., A.B.A. Sec. of Tax'n Planning Comm., Report on Exercise by the Treasury
Departmentand the Internal Revenue Service of the Authority Grantedby InternalRevenue
Code Section 7805(b) to Prescribethe Extent to Which Tax Rulings or Regulations Shall Be
Applied Without Retroactive Effect, 42 TAX LAW. 621 (1989); David W. Ball, Retroactive
Application of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M. L. REv. 139 (1987); Benjamin B.
Levin, Retroactivity in Tax Laws, Regulationsand Rulings, 9 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx'N.
581 (1951); John S. Nolan & Victor Thuronyi, RetroactiveApplication of Changes in IRS or
Treasury DepartmentPosition,TAXEs, Dec. 1983, at 777.
66. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1994).
67. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L.No. 104-168, sec. I101(a), § 7805(b), 110 Stat.
1452, 1468-69 (1996).
68. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2006).
69. See id. § 7805(b)(8).
70. Id. Other portions of § 7805(b) prescribe more detailed rules for the retroactivity of
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language suggests, and the courts have confirmed, that the presumption is in
favor of retroactive application of rulings, 7 '1but taxpayers may challenge IRS
decisions under § 7 805(b) on an "abuse of discretion" standard.7
Former § 7805(b) was the basis of one of the most widely debated IRS
consistency cases: the decision of the former Court of Claims in International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States.7 At the time, ]IBM and Remington
Rand were the sole competitors in the computer industry.7 Remington Rand
asked for and received from the IRS a private letter ruling stating that certain of
a few months, IBM
its transactions were exempt from excise tax.
sought a similar letter ruling.7 The IRS delayed for two years, then denied
IB3M's request and revoked-but only prospectively-the ruling granted to
Remington Rand.7 The denial and the revocation were correct: as a matter of
substantive law, the excise tax did apply to the transactions.
Remington Rand and ]IBM were now in the same position, except that the
former had benefitted from six years of improper exemption . 78 IBM brought
suit in the Court of Claims seeking refund of the excise tax it had paid for those
six years .79 A divided court held for the taxpayer, IBM, concluding that the IRS
had abused its discretion under § 7805(b) by retroactively applying the denial
of IBM's ruling request.8
'Within

tax regulations. See id. § 7805(b)(1)-(7). See generally Paul Gordon Hoffinan, Comment, Limits
on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue Service: Redefining Abuse of
Discretion Under Section 7805(b), 23 UCLA L. REv. 529 (1976) (tracing the development of
the doctrine of abuse of discretion as applied to § 7805(b)); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The
Casefor Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulators, 48 OmHo ST. L.J. 773 (1987) (arguing
that Treasury should adopt formal standards with regard to interpretive regulations); Note,
RetroactiveRevocation ofRevenue Rulings, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 91 (1967) (discussing the issues
created by retroactive application of rulings).
71. E.g., Manocchio v. Comm'r, 710 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1983).
72. E.g., Lesavoy Found. v. Comni'r, 238 F.2d 589, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1956). The courts
have looked to a variety of factors in determining whether retroactive revocation constitutes an
abuse of discretion. These include the period of the retroactivity, the extent of notice the
taxpayer received, the harm the taxpayer would suffer, and whether the taxpayer reasonably
relied on the revoked rule when entering into the transaction or filing their return. E.g., Dixon v.
United States, 381 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1965).
73. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
74. Idat 915-16.
75. Id. at 916.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 916-17.
78. Id. at 916. In addition to the two years between the letter rulings, Remington Rand
bad received a refund for the taxes paid on the transaction for the three years prior to their letter
ruling, and the correct ruling was not applied to Remington Rand for almost another year. Id
79. Idat 917.
80. Id. at92 1.
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It is "highly dubious" that IBM was correctly decided, even on its narrow
facts.8 In any event, the case does not establish § 7805(b) as a foundation for a
general duty of IRS consistency. In fact, the decision itself disclaimed this
possibility."2 The holding depended on the peculiar facts-the replication of
which would be exceedingly rare--of significant competitive effects between
two direct competitors.8 Recognizing the dubious quality of IBM and its
unusual circumstances, most subsequent cases have essentially limited the
decision to its facts. That is, the case-if it has any force at all-is applicable if
two conditions are present:
[I]t applies only where: (i) two or more taxpayers in direct economic
competition have each applied for a ruling and only one has received a
favorable ruling; and (ii) the taxpayer denied the favorable ruling is arguing
that the Commissioner abused his discretion under8 section 7805(b) by failing
to apply a new legal position only prospectively. 4
2. Non-Tax Statutes
Outside the Internal Revenue Code, the natural place to seek a statutory
basis for an IRS duty of consistency is the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). APA § 706(2)(A) allows courts to set aside agency actions that are
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."8 Section 706(2)(A) rarely appears in tax jurisprudence.8 Although
it may deserve a more prominent role in tax,8 the consistency doctrine is not
81.

Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to be

Consistent?, 40

TAx L. REv.

411, 422 (1985).

82. The court acknowledged that tax law often takes the stance "that taxpayers can never
avoid liability for a proper tax by showing that others have been treated generously, leniently, or
erroneously by the Internal Revenue Service-each individual must rest ...on the validity of
his own position, under the applicable taxing provision, independently of the others'." IBM, 343
F.2d at 919; see also Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 9, at 536-42 (stating that the idea that IBM
created a general duty of consistency is a "flawed view").
83. See IBM, 343 F.2d at 921 (noting that the IRS "could not help but know that each
month it lagged in responding to [IBM] would likely work a serious commercial detriment").
84. Vons Cos. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2001) (citing Knetsch v. United States,
348 F.2d 932,940 & n. 14 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558,564 n.2 (Ct.
Cl. 1965)). But see Computer Scis. Corp. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 388, 394 (2001)
(construing IBM broadly for taxpayers in similar situations).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
86. Recently, the courts have been forced to grapple with the role of the APA in cases
involving collection due process rights under I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330. E.g., Robinette v.
Comm'r, 439 F.3d455, 461 (8thCir. 2006), rev'g 123 T.C. 85 (2004). See generallyDanshera
Cords, Administrative Law and JudicialReview of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 429 (2007) (arguing that administrative law and review procedures applying to all other
agencies should also apply to the IRS).
87. See generallyMICHAEL 1. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1.03 (rev. 2d
ed. 2003) (discussing the APA and the IRS).
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the right stage for this increased capacity. As described in Part 1, the hard
consistency cases are those where the IRS' s second position is the accurate
interpretation of the Code. 88 It is hard to label a position as arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion when that position is correct under the governing
substantive statute.
Arguments for a statutory duty of consistency might also be made under
other portions of the APA. For example, APA § 706(2)(D) empowers courts to
overturn actions taken by agencies "without observance of procedure required
by law.",89 One could argue that "law" for this purpose includes common law.
Thus, if the courts create a consistency duty and the IRS doesn't conform, the
IRS's action would be taken "without observance of procedure required by
law." However, this would not itself be a statutory duty of consistency; rather,
at best, this would be a statutory channel for a judicial duty of consistency.
Still, the key questions would remain whether, taking the case law as a whole,
the courts have created the duty and, if they have, whether the creation was
legally valid and prudent.
The concept of ratification also should be considered. In the absence of an
explicit statute, one might argue for some legislative pedigree for the
consistency duty based on the inaction canon. Congress has not acted to
read inaction
affirmatively repudiate a consistency duty, and courts sometimes
90
as evincing the legislature's approval of the status quo.
This argument would have little force, however. The inaction canon is
among the weakest of statutory interpretation precepts, in part because
ascertaining a legislature's motive for acting "more often than not [is]
impossible.... [It is even harder] to evaluate why the leiislature failed to take
action. Such a question is fundamentally unanswerable." ' Moreover, there are
almost as many cases rejecting an IRS consistency duty as cases upholding
one-making it impossible92to determine which status quo Congress putatively
ratified through its silence.
88.

See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.

89. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
90. E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000)
("Indeed, this is not a case of simple inaction by Congress that purportedly represents its
acquiescence in an agency's position."); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600
(1983) (applying the inaction canon under circumstances found to be unusually compelling but
acknowledging that "[nlon-action by Congress is not often a useful guide"); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
has clearly evinced a desire
U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) ("Congress, by its positive inaction,. ...
not to disapprove them legislatively."). See generally Steve R. Johnson, The Reenactment and
Inaction Doctrinesin State Tax Litigation, 50 STATE TAx NoTEs 661 (2008) (describing the use
of these doctrines in interpreting tax statutes).
91. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Tongass Conservation Soc'y, 931 P.2d 1016, 1019-20
(Alaska 1997).
92. See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946) ("The silence of
Congress and its inaction are as consistent with a desire to leave the problem fluid as they are
with an adoption by silence of [a particular] rule ... );Comm'r v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,

119-20 (1940).
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C Case Law Dimensions
Without an applicable current statute, the courts have responded to
consistency controversies in a common law manner,9 3 and they have been aided
by an extensive body of literature on federal common law .94 "The topic . .. is
particularly difficult because the label falsely implies that a coherent body of
law has
legal principles exists. Quite to the contrary, federal common
95
developed in an ad hoc fashion in a number of different areas.",
Common law making is something of an anomaly in tax. Taxation is highly
positivistic, and no one is liable for tax absent statutory command. The
legislature's undoubted primacy in establishing the substantive rules of taxation
has led some to suggest that the legislature should also be the exclusive source
of the procedural rules of taxation. 9 6 Such a resolution, of course, would
exclude a non-statutory duty of IRS consistency. However, so stark a view has
not gained the ascendancy. There are important common law aspects of federal
taxation. 9 7 The question that manifests is whether the common law for a
governmental duty of tax consistency has served society well. Unfortunately,
the doctrinal chaos described below reveals the failure of common law making
in this area.
Three principal views of the consistency duty have been offered through
cases and commentary: the "strong duty," the "no duty," and the "weak duty."
More accurately, the "weak duty" encompasses a set of views due to the
numerous varieties that have been advanced.
1. "Strong Duty" View
The "strong duty" view offers that: (1) a governmental duty of tax
consistency should and does exist, and (2) the remedy for IRS inconsistency
should be complete victory for the taxpayer, i.e., the IRS 's determination or
adjustment should fail entirely. Some cases have used consistency as the
rationale for holding against the IRS.9 For example, in one case, members of
93. "The source or sources of the consistency requirement are not entirely clear. It is
probably best understood as a doctrine of administrative common law." Zelenak, supranote 8 1,
at 413.

94. See, e.g.,

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDicTION

363-64 & n.1I (5th ed. 2007).

95. Id at 368.
96. E.g., DeArmond v. Dep't of Revenue, 14 Or. Tax 112, 117-18 (Or. T.C. 1997), affd,
968 P.2d 1280 (Or. 1998).
97. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the FederalFisc: Tenancy-by-theEntireties Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 Mo. L. REv. 839, 855-68 (1995) (discussing
the common law aspects of federal tax collection).
98. E.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998); Powell v.
United States, 945 F.2d 374, 377-78 (1llth Cir. 1991); see also Hoff'er, supra note 19, at 34041 (discussing the Court's use of private letter rulings as precedent in the face of§ 611 0(k)(3)).
Some of the cases have recognized an exception for situations where the IRS takes inconsistent
positions to avoid being "whipsawed"-to prevent the fisc from losing on both ends, the IRS is

20101

2010]
AN IRS DUTY OF CONSISTENCY58

581

the taxpayer's family occasionally occupied seats on an airplane owned by the
taxpayer's company that otherwise would have been empty during business
flights. 99 The IRS maintained that the value of the family members' flights
constituted income taxable to the taxpayer.' 0 A trial, the tax court found the
IRS' s position "very logical .. , under the broad definition of income in [I.R.C.]
section 61."101 Nonetheless, the court rejected the IRS' s position because the
parties had agreed that the IRS had not made this type of adjustment for similar
taxpayers: "We do not here determine the validity of [the IRS's] argument if
[its] longstanding practice were changed as to all taxpayers. We merely hold
that [the IRS' s] practice . .. should be app~lied to [this taxpayer] on the same
basis as it is applied to other taxpayers."0
Other cases have stated in dictum that the IRS is subject to a judicially
enforceable duty of consistency but have not felt the need to describe it with
particularity.10 3 Weakest by way of support, yet still worth noting, are cases
where the courts could have declared the non-existence of an IRS consistency
duty, but refrained from doing so. For example, in Hernandez v. Commissioner,
the IRS determined that payments made to the Church of Scientology for
"auditing" and related services did not qualify for income tax deduction as
charitable contributions.104 The Scientologists responded, in part, that these
payments were indistinguishable from payments made to other religions that the
IRS had accepted as charitable contribution deductions. 05 The Hernandez
dissent accepted this argument,'06 but the majority rejected it and held for the
IRS'107 on the disingenuous ground that comparability of the various payments
was not feasible because the record was insufficiently developed.108 One might
allowed to take inconsistent positions to combat inconsistent treatment of a transaction by the
two taxpayers who were the parties to the same transaction. See Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r,
476 F.2d 981, 988 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973).
99. Vesco v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101, 129 (1979).
100. Id at 129-30.
101. Id at 129.
102. Id at 129-30.
103. E.g., United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299,308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("(It can be an independent ground of decision that the Commissioner has been
inconsistent.. . ."); Conway Imp. Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 5, 14-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1969);
Computer Scis. Corp. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 388 (2001).
104. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 686 (1989).
105. Idat701.
106. Id. at 707-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. Id at 702-03 (majority opinion).
108. Id. at 700-403. Nearly a decade after prevailing in Hernandez, the IRS gave its victory
away in a closing agreement with the Scientologists. See Internal Revenue Serv., Closing
Agreement Between IRS and Church of Scientology, 97 TAx NOTEs TODAY 251-24 (Dec. 3 1,
1997). Some have speculated that the IRS did so because it realized that it would lose in future
litigation where fuilly developed records would reveal that the payments to other faiths that the
IRS had accepted as deductible are in fact not distinguishable from the payments to Scientology.
See WLAm D. PopKiN, INTRODucTioN To TAxATION 222-23 (5th ed. 2008).
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have thought-especially given the weakness of the rationale-that the
majority would have expressly stated that "the IRS is under no duty of
consistency" had it genuinely believed that to be the state of the law.'09
The "strong duty" view appears to be gaining momentum in some quarters.
For example, older tax court decisions usually rejected the notion that the IRS
is subject to a judicially enforceable consistency duty."' 0 Yet, several recent tax
court opinions have upheld this duty or something verycoprbe"
However, choosing the "strong duty" position only disposes of the
threshold question for resolving the consistency problem. Once it is concluded
that the courts can force the IRS to treat similar taxpayers similarly, it must then
be decided whether particular taxpayers are in fact similarly situated in ways
sometimes drawn fine
that are relevant to the tax system. The courts have
2
distinctions in holding situations to be dissimilar."
At times, agency inconsistency has entered non-tax cases incident to
statutory interpretation rather than as part of a formal consistency doctrine. An
example is the Supreme Court's Brown & Williamson decision holding that the
FDA lacks authority to regulate normal use of tobacco products.' '3The FDA
asserted this authority to regulate in 1996 after having expressly and repeatedly
disavowed the power from the agency's inception.""1 The Supreme Court
acknowledged, as it had in Chevron,' '5that "an agency's initial interpretation
of a statute that it is charged with administering is not 'carved in stone[,]"' and
109. However, negative inferences are often unreliable guides. E.g., Bums v. United States,
501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); 1ll. Dep't of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273. 277 (7th Cir.
1983) ("Not every silence is pregnant ... ).Moreover, the special nature of Hernandez might
dispel any negative inference. For First Amendment reasons, treating taxpayers differently on
account of their religious affiliations is more disturbing than treating taxpayers differently for no
affiliational reason. Hernandez may reflect no more than the special context where the arguable
inconsistency took place. See Hernandez, 490 U. S. at 707 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Powell v.
United States, 945 F.2d 374, 377-78 (11 th Cir. 1991).
110. E.g., Avedisian v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 503, 505 (1987); Penn-Field Indus. v.
Conim'r, 74 T.C. 720, 722 (1980); Davis v. Comm'r (Davis]1), 65 T.C. 1014, 1022-23 (1976)
(citing many cases for this position).
I11. E.g., Rowe v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 13,21-26 (2007) (Gale, J., concurring); id at 27-28
(Goeke, J., concurring); Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 170-71 (2002) (stating that
while revenue rulings are not binding on the Court or other federal courts, they may be in tax
court proceedings).
112. E.g., Sklar v. Comm'r, 549 F.3d 1252, 126.4-65 (9th Cir. 2008); Sklar v. Comm'r,
282 F.3d 610, 615-18 (9th Cir. 2002) (both cases holding that those making payments to
schools that provide both secular and religious instruction are situated differently than those
making payments to organizations providing religious services exclusively); Bookwalter v.
Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78, 79, 84 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that taxpayers engaged in similar
transactions were situated differently because one requested a private letter ruling and the other
did not).
113. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
114. Idatl125.
115. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,863-64 (1984).
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their rules and policies
that "agencies 'must be given ample latitude to1 "adapt
6
to the demands of changing circumstances.""'...
Nonetheless, as a matter of statutory construction, the agency's prior
position weighed against its new position, and the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to empower the17FDA with the asserted authority
through any of the agency's enabling acts.' 7 The Court wrote that by "adopting
each statute, Congress has acted against the backdrop of the FDA's consistent
and repeated statements that it lacked authority .. , to regulate tobacco absent
claims of therapeutic benefit by the manufacturer. . .. Congress' tobaccospecific statutes have effectively ratified the FDA's long-held position that it
lacks jurisdiction. .. .118 Thus, a consistent and well-known agency position
led to statutory construction adverse to the newly asserted agency position.
2. "No Duty" View
The opposite of the "strong duty" notion is the view that the IRS is under
no subconstitutional duty of consistency at all-or at least that any duty is only
moral and not judicially enforceable. Under this view, aggrieved taxpayers are
not afforded any relief. Moreover, there is abundant support in the case law for
this view as well."'9
Many of the "no duty" cases arose out of discovery disputes such as two
disputes between the IRS and Kenneth Culp Davis, a leading administrative
law scholar, and his spouse, in their capacities as taxpayers.'10 The first case
involved business expense deductions that the Davises claimed were education
costs incurred by Mrs. Davis.12 '1The taxpayers sought to discover private letter
rulings and technical advice memoranda issued by the IRS for similar
deductions 12to support the argument that the IRS had treated similarly-situated
23
taxpayers differently. 1

Although it acknowledged the conflicting values at work, the court rejected
the taxpayers' discovery demands as irrelevant to the substantive issues:

116. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted). An important question
is the extent to which the IRS should be treated like other administrative agencies for Chevron
and other purposes. For discussion of this question, see Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the
Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is

Undesirable,77

OR. L. Rnv.

235, 276-86 (1998).

117. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144.
118. Id.
119. E.g., Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Coinm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1936); Temple v.
Comm'r, 62 F. App'x 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2003); Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. Comnm'r, 571
F.2d 1371, 1376 (5th Cir. 1978); Vons Cos. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 6-12 (2001).
120. See Davis v. Commn'r (Davis .11), 69 T.C. 716 (1978); Davis v. Comm'r (Davis]), 65
T.C. 1014 (1976).
121. Davis 1,65 T.C. at 1016.

12 2. Id.
123.

Id.at102 1.
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It has long been the position of this Court that our responsibility is to
apply the law to the facts of the case before us and determine the tax liability
of the parties before us; how the Commissioner may have treated other
taxpayers has generally been considered irrelevant in making that
determination. Any change in that position would have widespread
ramifications in the administration and application of the Federal tax laws and
in the conduct of our work.'124
In a subsequent case, the Davises again tested the viability of the
consistency doctrine when they were alleged to have claimed improper income
inclusions and charitable contribution deductions.125 The taxpayers again
sought to discover private letter rulings issued to other taxpayers to probe
whether the IRS had operated inconsistently.12 6 The court acknowledged that
some courts had recognized an IRS consistency duty,'2 but it again rejected the
discovery demands as it expressed "serious doubts about the validity of [a
consistency] claim in ordinary tax deficiency cases which are tried de novo in
28
this Court."1
There also is a sub silencio version of this view. Many cases reasonably
presenting consistency questions have been decided for the IRS with little or no
discussion of those issues. 129 Perhaps this implies the rejection of a duty's
existence. More likely, it reflects the fact that the court did not recognize or did
not wish to address the inquiries.
3. "Weak Duty" Views
Between the two polar views, various intermediate positions have been
advocated. These intermediate positions suggest that the IRS is under some
enforceable consistency duty but that either (1) the duty applies in less than all
situations, or (2) the sanction for violating the duty is something less than the
IRS losing the case. At least four "weak duty" views have been offered thus far
by courts, the IRS, or commentators.

124. Id. at 1022-23 (citations omitted).
125. Davis 1, 69 T.C. at 716.
126. Id. at 718.
127. Idat721.
128. Id at 721 n.9 (citing Davis , 65 T.C. at 1021-23; Teichgaeber v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.
453, 456 (1975)).
129. In one case, the Court of Federal Claims rejected the Government's contention that
the so-called "open transaction" doctrine had been interred in 1957. Fisher v. United States, 82
Fed. CI. 780, 791 (2008). The court stressed that cases since 1957 had continued to invoke the
doctrine. Id It also noted that the IRS itself had continued to assert the doctrine after 1957. Id
However, it did not construct a duty of consistency argument from this fact but merely
mentioned it incidentally. See id
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a. A Duty if the IRS Has Discretion
One view is that any consistency requirement should be stronger when the
IRS' s actions or interpretations are in an area of tax law where it has
discretion.130 A principal objection to a governmental duty of consistency is that
Congress writes the tax laws and the IRS cannot change the law by
malfeasance.13 '1This object ion has diminished significance to the extent the IRS
has discretion on how to apply the tax law.
The traditional view is that the IRS has minimal discretion: the Internal
Revenue Code sets out definite rules for the determination of tax liabilities, and
the IRS's job is simply to apply those rules. This view is correct in the main,
but there are significant pockets of administrative discretion within the
generally non-discretionary system. Here are some examples:
(1) Nearly three hundred provisions in the Code expressly grant to
Treasury and the IRS the power to write regulations in order to implement or
prevent the abuse of particular sections.13 2 It is widely accepted that these socalled "specific-authority" regulations qualify for Chevron deeece 3 A
premise of this deference is that Congress expressly or impliedly delegated
authority for the purpose of crafting substantive rules.'3 It is difficult to
successfully challenge the validity of specific-authority regulations;' 35 thus,
fortifying the idea that Treasury and the IRS have significant (though far from
unlimited136) law making discretion in these areas.
130. "In exercising its interpretive discretion, the IRS might have the discretion to decide
whether or not an item is taxable, but once that decision is made, it must be applied equally to
all taxpayers." Bunce v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 500, 509 (1993) (dictum), affidper curiam,
26 F.3d 138 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1024
n. 15, 1025 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "the Commissioner will be held to his published rulings
in areas where the law is unclear"); Silco, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 282, 286 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that taxpayer may rely on prior rulings to determine actual ownership of
dividends); Cohen & Harrington, supra note 19, at 707-09 (discussing judicial developments
relaxing the harsh rule of Manhattan General).
131. See infra Part V.B.1.
132. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack 0])
Compliancewith AdministrationProcedureAct Rule Making Requirements, 82 NoTRE DAMvE L.
REv. 1727, 1735 & n.37 (2007). See generallyJasper L. Cummings, Jr., Treasury Violates the
APA?, 117 TMCNoTEs 263 (2007) (disagreeing with some of Hickman's analysis); Kristin E.
Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with
Administrative ProcedureAct Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1153 (2008)
(discussing potential dissentives to pursuing claims created by "statutory and doctrinal
obstacles").
133. E.g., Carlos v. Commn'r, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004); Square D Co. v. Comm'r, 118
T.C. 299, 307 (2002), aff'd, 438 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2006).
134. Eg., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
135. See, e.g., Rowan Cos. v. Comm'r, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
136. Even specific-authority regulations are invalid if they are in tension with the statute or
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(2) Even when particular sections do not confer specific authority on
Treasury and the IRS to write rules and regulations, Code § 7805(a) provides
general authority to draft rules and regulations, authority that extends to all
parts of the Code.'137 Although it is not yet fuiiy settled whether Chevron
deference attaches to "general-authority" tax regulations, 138 these regulations
receive substantial deference from the courts 13-i theory somewhat less
40
deference than "regulation[s] issued under a specific grant of authority."
Treasury and the IRS have often made what clearly are major substantive
choices through general-authority regulations,'14 ' suggesting a wide scope of
law making discretion.
A prominent example involves the so-called "check the box" generalauthority regulations. Different rules govern the taxation of partnerships and
corporations,14 2 makinf principles defining these categories necessary. A 1935
Supreme Court case' .3 and subsequent cases'" established classificatory
criteria, and, in 1960, Treasury and the IRS promulgated general-authority
regulations that largely incorporated these case law principles.14 5 However, the
popularity of hybrid entities such as limited partnerships and limited liability
companies created classificatory uncertainties. In 1996, Treasury and the IRS
radically revised the regulations to make entity classification largely elective for
go beyond the scope of the delegation. Specific-authority regulations have been held invalid by
the courts surprisingly often. E.g., Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Phillips Pet. v. Comm'r, No. 94-9021, 1995 WL 699026 (10th Cir. Nov. 28, 1995);
Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 269 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v.
Comni'r, 103 T.C. 656, 671 (1994), rev'd, 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that regulation
invalidated by tax court but validated on appeal); Estate of Bullard v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 261, 281
(1986).
137. As to the distinction between specific-authority and general-authority tax regulations,
see Steve R. Johnson, Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law, 112
TAx Nom~s 773, 780-81 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Swallows as It Might Have Been).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 32 8-32.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973) (stating that
regulations must be upheld if "found to 'implement the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner"' (citation omitted)).
140. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24-25 (1982); see also Nat'l
Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979). Some commentators doubt
that the courts actually do defer more readily to specific-authority than to general-authority

regulations. E.g.,

Boals 1. BnlxEn, MARTIN J. McMAHoN JR. & LAWRENCE

FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF INDwvIUALs

A.

ZELENAK,

46-5 (3d ed. 2002); Johnson, Swallows aslt Might

Have Been, supra note 137, at 780-8 1.
141. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (2009).
142. Compare I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (2006) (corporations), with I.R.C. §§ 701-777 (2006)
(partnerships).
143. Morriseyv. Cormm'r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
144. E.g., United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 421-24 (9th Cir. 1954); Larson v.
Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159, 172 & n.8 (1976).
145. Internal Revenue Service, Procedure and Adniinistraion, 25 Fed. Reg. 10,928,
10,928-33 (Nov. 17, 1960) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
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many entities.46 Eligible entities can now choose whether to be treated as
partnerships or as corporations for federal tax purposes.14 7 The revised
regulations are known as the "check the box" rules due to the element of
choice.
This dramatic change of direction was controversial from the beginning.
Some commentators maintained that the new regulations were invalid,'14
although most thought to the contrary.'14 9 To date, the cases have upheld the
regulations. 5 0 Thus, Treasury and the IRS have been permitted to shift an
important set of rules from a mandatory regime based on Supreme Court and
other case law to an elective regime-all without essentially changing the
underlying statute. This suggests a substantial range of administrative
discretion. 151
(3) At the subregulation level, the IRS often has made substantive rules
that are not clearly mandated by the applicable Code sections. Frequently, these
are taxpayer-friendly or simplifying rules.'15 2 Even when these rules are not
controversial, they nonetheless represent the exercise of administrative
discretion.
(4) It is no secret that some Code sections are exceedingly complex or
regrettably ambiguous. As a practical matter, Treasury and the IRS probably
of these sections, especially when
require greater discretion in application
53
deference doctrines are considered.1
146. Internal Revenue Service, Procedure and Administration, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,588,66,590
(Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 26 C.F.R. 301.7701-1 to -3).
147. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (2009).

148.

E.g.,

WILLIAm

S. MCKEE,

WILLLAm

TAxATION OF PARTNERSHIPs AND PARTNERS

F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHiTMIXE, FEDERAL
3-102 (3d ed. 1997); Gregg D. Poisky, Can

Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REv. 185, 186 (2004); see also Heather M.
Field, Checking in on "Check-the-Box, "42 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 451 (2009) (discussing policy
weaknesses of the elective regime).
149. E.g., Susan Kalinka, Littriello: Are the Check-the-Box Regulations Valid?, TAXES,
Sept. 2007, at 17, 17 (reviewing the history and concluding that the new regulations are valid).
150. Kandi v. United States, 295 F. App'x 873, 874 (9th Cir. 2008); McNamee v. United
States, 488 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2007); Littriello, v. United States, 484 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1290 (2008); L&L Holding Co. v. United States, Nos. 05-0794A, 05-0817-A, 2008 WL 1908840 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2008); Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v.
Comm'r, 132 T.C. No. 7 (2009); see also Steamn & Co. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 2d 899
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (applying the "check-the-box" regulations).
151. Nonetheless, there are numerous examples of the courts invalidating general-authority
regulations. E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16,26 (1982); Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 263 (198 1); Conim'r v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433
U.S. 148, 163 (1977); Ne. Penin. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 21415, 221-22 (1967).
152. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2002-28, 2002-1 C.B. 815 (permitting expensing, rather than
capitalization, of certain expenses for small businesses); Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549
(allowing limited deferral of taxability of some payments received for personal services).
153. For discussion of doctrines of deference in tax, see Johnson, Swallows as I Might
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For these reasons, the IRS probably has more discretion in making the tax
law than traditionally has been acknowledged. The first "weak duty" view
would impose a duty of consistency on the IRS in situations where it possesses
this discretion.
b. A Duty ofJRS FactualRepresentations Only
The second "weak duty" view is one the IRS acknowledged in a low-level
internal memorandum.'154 Under it, the IRS would have a consistency duty
when (1) the IRS makes a representation of fact for one year, (2) the taxpayer
acquiesces in or relies on that representation, and (3) the IRS changes that
representation in a later year after expiration of the statute of limitations for the
earlier year. 155 This approach is patterned on the elements that are widely used
15 6
when a duty of consistency is applied against taxpayers.
c. A Duty to Explain or Repudiate
The third "weak duty" view is the "explain or repudiate" approach. That is,
the IRS would be held to its earlier position unless the IRS provided a cogent
explanation. An explanation could include (1) that the earlier and current
positions are not inconsistent, (2) that the positions are inconsistent but the
agency had good reasons for changing its position, or (3) a forthright admission
by the IRS that its prior position was wrong. The principal support for this
approach comes from 8non-tax administrative law cases, 15 7 but some tax cases
5
also have adopted it.'

Have Been, supra note 137, at 779-86; Steve R. Johnson, Swallows Holding as It Is: The
Distortion of National Muffler, 112 TAx Norns 351, 361-65 (2006); Christopher M.

Pietruszkiewicz, DiscardedDeference: JudicialIndependence in InformalAgency Guidance, 74
TENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (using IRS guidance as "the basis for application of an intermediate

deference doctrine").
154. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200026006 (June 30, 2000).
15 5. Id.
156. See, e.g., Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1974); McMillan v.
United States, No. 3714, 1964 WL 12374, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 4, 1964).
157. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 542, 549 (1978); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800,
807-08 (1973) (plurality opinion); Sec'y of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653 (1954);
NLRB v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 604 (5th Cir. 1972).
For commentary, see David H.E. Becker, JudicialReview of INS Adjudication: When May the
Agency Make Sudden Changes in Policy and Apply Its Decisions Retroactively?, 52 ADmi. L.
Rnv. 219, 233-34 (2000); Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADmIN. L. Rnv.
995, 1009-10 (2005); Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Actionfor Inconsistency with Prior
Rules and Regulations, 72 Cu1.-KENT L. REv. 1187, 1243-51 (1997); Joshua 1.Schwartz, The
IrresistibleForce Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for anAgency's Violation of
Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADmIN. L. Rnv. 653 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld,
Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraintson Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L.
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The Sirbo cases provide good examples. In Sirbo I, the taxpayer sought
preferential long-term capital gain treatment with respect to an alleged
involuntary conversion ofproperty.159 The IRS opposed the requested treatment
despite not opposing it in a prior case involving a different taxpayer.16 0 The tax
court agreed with the IRS,' ' but the Second Circuit vacated and remanded, in
part on consistency grounds.16 2 The circuit court stated:
[T]he Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly situated
taxpayers; he cannot properly concede capital gains treatment in one case
and, without adequate explanation, dispute it in another having seemingly
identical facts which is pending at the same time. That the Commissioner's
seeming inconsistency may have arisen from the right hand's ignorance ofthe
posture of the left is little solace to taxpayers who are entitled to a nondiscriminatory administration of the tax laws by him, much less to a taxpayer
like Sirbo who is disadvantaged by the discrimination in its case. 63
On remand, in Sirbo II, the tax court reaffirmed its holding. 6 The IRS
explained that its contrar position in the prior case "was not considered policy
The Second Circuit accepted this explanation and
but rather was an error.
affirmed: "While even-handed treatment should be the Commissioner's goal,
perfection in the administration of such vast responsibilities cannot be
expected. The making of an error in one case, if error it was, gives other
taxpayers no right to its perpetuation., 66
Despite the appeal of doctrinal symmetry, the "explain or repudiate"
approach is unlikely the answer to the consistency problem. The courts have
had ample opportunity to fully embrace this position in tax but have failed to do
so. The principal argument for this approach was set forth in a 1985 article by a
leading tax academic in a prominent tax journal.'67 In the ensuing decades,
REv. 429 (1999) (discussing the clash between agency flexibility and "rule of law" values
generally); Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071
(1990).
158. E.g., Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r (Sirbol),476 F.2d 981,987-88 (2d Cir. 1973);
Pac. First Fed. Say. Bank v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 117, 125 (1993).
159. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r (Sirbo 1), 57 T.C. 530, 537 (1972), vacated &
remanded,476 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973).
160. Id. at 539.
161. Id.
162. Sirbo I, 476 F.2d at 989.
163. Id. at 987-88 (citations omitted).
164. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r (Sirbo II), 61 T.C. 723, 727 (1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d
1220 (2d Cir. 1975).
165. Sirbo II, 509 F.2d at 1222.
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. Zelenak, supra note 81; see also Meade Emory & Lawrence Zelenak, The Tax Exempt
Status of Communitarian Religious Organizations: An Unnecessary Controversy?, 50
FORDHAM L. REv. 1085, 1097-99 (1982) (prefiguring Professor Zelenak's 1985 article).

590

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:563

however, the idea has gained limited traction in tax cases and has been
acknowledged largely in passing by most of the commentary.' 6 8
d. A Duty UnderAmended § 7805(b)

For the reasons described in Part III.B. 1, no current section of the Internal
Revenue Code can serve as the statutory foundation for a general duty of IRS
consistency.16 9 That includes § 7805(b), the basis of the much discussed, albeit
dubious, IBM decision.170 As a result, one commentator, Professor
Pietruszkiewicz, has proposed amending § 7805(b) to make it a more viable
vehicle for imposing a consistency duty. 7' The thrust of his proposal is to
broaden the scope of review under the section and to adopt a uniform standard
of abuse of discretion applicable to consistency cases.1 72 Specifically, the
proposal would grant relief to taxpayers who satisfy both parts of a two-prong
test."' First, the taxpayer would have "to demonstrate that another similarly
situated taxpayer received more favorable treatment, despite the taxpayer's
request for the same treatment. Second, the IRS must have abused its discretion
under § 7805(b) when it used irrational or arbitrary classifications to
differentiate among similarly situated taxpayers." 74
IV. THEORETICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE "NO DUTY" VIEW
A. Arguments for a "Strong Duty"
1. Fairness
"[T]he notion of equal justice has strong appeal in our society .... "'175
Courts' 6 and the IRS itsel 7 7 have repeatedly acknowledged that horizontal
168. See, e.g., Cohen & Harrington, supra note 19, at 679 & n.26; Hoffer, supranote 19, at
339; Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 9, at 532.
169. See, e.g., Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en
Maatschappelijke Belangen v. United States, 129 F.3d 195, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting
a consistency argument based on § 7805(b)).
170. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States (IBM), 343 F.2d 914, 919 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
171. Pietruszkiewicz, supranote 9, at 534-35.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 573.
174. Id.
175. Davis v. Comm'r (Davis 1), 65 T.C. 1014, 1023 (1976).
176. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948) ("[C]ollateral estoppel must
be used with its limitations carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice."); Burnet v. Harmel, 287
U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (explaining that tax legislation generally "is to be interpreted so as to give
a uniform application to a nation-wide scheme of taxation").
177. The IRS commits itself to "applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all."
I.R.S. Mission, 2007-2 C.B. ii; see also I.R.M. 1.2.13.1.5 (Dec. 23, 1960) (directing IRS agents
to determine correct tax liability "without favoritism or discrimination as between taxpayers").
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equity-that is, treating similarly-situated taxpayers similarly-is an important
goal of our tax system.
Justice Holmes long ago cautioned that citizens "must turn square corners
when they deal with the Govemment[]"'1 8 but "[i]t is no less good morals and
good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the
people." 7
Congress delegated extensive authority to the Department of the Treasury
to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the
Internal Revenue Code]." 8 0 This broad delegation is premised in part on the
need to "ensure that in 'this area of limitless factual variations,' like cases will
8
be treated alike."'1 '
Additionally, in recent decades, Congress enacted a series of taxpayer
rights measures, including the Taxpayer Bill of Rights in 1988,182 the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights 2 in 1996, 183 the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3 in 1998,'84 and a
number of more limited measures.185 Thus prodded, the IRS implemented other
taxpayer rights changes administratively.'18 6 These measures were driven by the
However, fairness is but one of many goals. The actions of IRS agents "should be reasonable
within the bounds of law and sound administration," and the IRS has the obligation of
"correctly applying the laws enacted by Congress." Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
Moreover, the courts typically have not enforced the aspirational language in the IRS's policy
statements. E.g., Adams v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 654, 669 (1978).
178. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
179. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black's retort has frequently been cited by the Court. E.g., United States v. Winstar
Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 886 n.31 (1996); see also Comrn'r v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Government in moving against the citizen should also turn
square corners."). In an equitable estoppel case, a circuit court remarked, "[ult has been well said
that the government should always be a gentleman. Taxpayers expect, and are entitled to
receive, ordinary fair play from tax officials." Stockstrom v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C.
Cir. 195 1). However, the Supreme Court soon thereafter disapproved of that decision. See Auto.
Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957) ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel is
not a bar to the correction by the [IRS] of a mistake of law.").
180. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
181. Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
182. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Ominbus Taxpayer Bill of Rights,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730-52 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
183. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified as
amnended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
184. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 3, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 726-83 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
185. E.g., Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104 (1997)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
186. See generally Charles 0. Rossotti, Modernizing America's Tax Agency, 83 TAX
No-TEs 1191 (1999) (providing "an overview of the entire process of change that the IRS is
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perception that federal tax administration was unfair, in some instances to the
7
point of oppression. 81

Hence, general fairness and, in particular, horizontal equity, are important
goals of our tax system. The realization of these goals is frustrated when the
188
IRS treats taxpayers inconsistently.
Having acknowledged that there are genuine fairness concerns regarding
IRS inconsistency, one fairness argument that lacks merit should be dispelled.
Although its contours have been drawn somewhat differentlyv by various courts,
it is settled that there is a duty of consistency on taxpayers.' 9 If taxpayers have
to be consistent, shouldn't the Government bear a reciprocal obligation? Not
necessarily; the words "duty of consistency" have different meanings in the two
contexts. The taxpayer duty of consistency is individual, while the
governmental duty of consistency considered in this article is comparative. The
taxpayer duty prevents a taxpayer from assuming a position on a later-year
return inconsistent with a position taken on an earlier-year return, particularly
when the earlier-year return is closed to correction because of a statute of
limitations'" 0 or other legal bar.' 9 1 Naturally, the perspective is individual to
that taxpayer, not comparative to other taxpayers. The fact that each taxpayer
bears a bilateral (the individual taxpayer relative to the IRS) duty of consistency
does not require, as a condition of fairness, that the IRS bear a multilateral (the
92
IRS relative to all taxpayers) duty of consistency.1
2. Rule of Law
Rule of law considerations overlap to some degree with the fairness
considerations discussed above, but there are shades of difference as well. Rule
93
of law theory has been explored in many classic and not-so-classic works,1
undertaking").
187. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the New Burden-of-ProofRules, 84 IOWA L. REv. 413,446-48 (1999) [hereinafter
Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation].
188. Consistency in taxation shares some rationales with staredecisis in judicial decisions.
See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904-05 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated &
remanded on other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cit. 2000) (discussing the desirability for
courts to justify' their departures from judicial precedents).
189. See, e.g., LeFever v. Conm'r, 100 F.3d 778, 787-89 (10th Cir. 1996); Steve R.
Johnson, The Taxpayer'sDuty of Consistency, 46 TAx L. REv. 537 (1991) [hereinafter Johnson,
The Taxpayer'sDuty of Consistency];see also Michael E.Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule:
A Proposalfor Resolving the Substance-FormDebate, 48 TAx LAW. 289 (1995) (proposing
expanding taxpayer consistency duties).
190. See I.R.C. § 6501 (2006); RICHARDSON, BORISON & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
191. Such as the doctrine of res judicata.
192. But see Hoffer, supra note 19, at 344-46 (maintaining that the values served by the
taxpayer duty of consistency also argue for an IRS duty of consistency).
193. E.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW (rev. ed. 1977); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsideringthe Rule of Law, 89 B.U. L. REv. 781 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
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and it has enjoyed a revival of attention in recent years.'194 These explorations
have made their way into tax-law scholarship.' 95
9
Rule of law is an "elusive but vital conception."' 9 It is elusive because the
phrase is not confined to one or even a few generally understood elements or
premises. In fact, there are versions of rule of law, sometimes known as "thin
versus thick" or "normal versus extravagant."1'9 Generally, though, "The rule
of law is an amalgam of standards, expectations, and aspirations: it
encompasses traditional ideas about individual liberty and natural justice, and,
more generally, ideas about the requirements 9 8of justice and fairness in the
relations between government and governed."'1
Some commentators view limiting the discretion of administrative agencies
as an important aspect of the rule of law. 199 That idea is of limited relevance to
IRS consistency, however. As we have defined the problem, 20 0 when the IRS
takes a position incompatible with an earlier position, it is not acting out of
discretion; it is acting in conformity to the statute.
Conversely, two other rule of law notions do relate to IRS consistency.
First, Government treating similarly-situated citizens similarly is itself often
identified as a component of the rule of law.20 Second, the idea of reliance is
rules in order to
significant: "Those with business interests need reliable
etn
,,202
To the etn
achieve certainty and predictability in their operations.
taxpayer knew about an earlier position taken by the IRS and relied on it in
structuring transactions and reporting their effects, the case becomes stronger
for preventing the IRS from retracting its position for that taxpayer.
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
194. E.g., Brian Z. Tainanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 469 (2007).
195. E.g., Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and "ClearReflection of
Income": What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUn. POL'Y 445, 463-92 (1999)
(discussing "rule of law values in federal tax law"); Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner's Clear
Reflection ofIncome Power Under §~ 446(b) and the Abuse of Discretion StandardofReview:
Where Has the Rule of Law Gone, and Can We Get it Back?, 15 AKRON TAx J. 69 (2000).
196. Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the
Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491, 491 (2008).
197. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
28-33 (1969) (arguing that "American law has decisively rejected the extravagant version of the
rule of law").
198. T. R. S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH
CoNsTrrunroNAuism 21 (1993).
199. E.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BuREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES 215 (1987); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 198 (8th ed. 1915).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
201. E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, WHAT Do WE MEAN BY THE RULE OF LAW? 2-3 (2005);
JEFFREY L. JOWELL, LAW AND BUREAUCRACY: ADMINISTIRATIvE DISCRETION AND THE LIMITS OF
LEGAL ACTION 12-13 (1975).

202.

JOWELL, supra note 201, at 13.
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3. Tax Administration

Part IV.B.4 will describe how too robust a consistency duty could impede
efficient and effective operation of our tax system, but tax administration
arguments are not all on one side of the ledger. An IRS consistency duty might
fortify the system in three specific ways.
First, the IRS cannot audit all of the millions of tax returns it receives each

year. 203 Indeed, current audit rates are at or near historic Iows. 2 04 That being so,
self-reporting-the accuracy of tax liabilities reported by taxpayers on their
returs-is the bedrock of our system .205 Dependable self-reporting requires a
high level of citizen confidence in, or at least acceptance of, the system's
fairness. If the IRS erodes that confidence or acceptance through
maladministration, including IRS inconsistency, the soundness of self-reporting
could be threatened. 0
Second, the nation's tax laws are administered not only by the IRS but also
by the tens of thousands of tax lawyers and tax accountants who advise their
clients in planning, structuring, and reporting transactions. For tax professionals
to do their jobs properly, they must be able to ascertain the law and predict its
application with reasonable certainty. Positional changes by the IRS frustrate
responsible tax planning and undermine taxpayers' confidence in their advisors.
Third, hard cases make bad law,20 and judges who have no identifiable
doctrinal path to reach the result they desire sometimes carve out new and

twisted avenues, doing mischief to doctrinal

clarity. 208

Judges occasionally

engage in these contortions in cases presenting IRS inconsistency. 2 09 The
availability of a recognized duty of consistency with defined contours might
provide judges with a method to satisfy their tropism towards fairness without
violently wrenching other doctrines.

203.

For fiscal year 2008, the IRS received over 250 million tax returns of all types, a 6.3%

increase from the previous year.
2009).
204.

INTEENAL REvENuE SERv. DATA BooK,

2008 4 (Publ'n 55B

See, e.g., Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax

Compliance and Tax Simpli~fication, 51 U.KAN.

L. REv. 1013,

10 15-27 (2003).

205. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983); I.R.C. Proc. §
601.103(a) (2009).
206. "[I]t is widely believed that taxpayers are more likely to comply voluntarily if they
believe that the tax code is implemented fairly and consistently across taxpayers." U.S. Gov'r
AccouNTAnarryx OFFICE,

supra note 1, at 8.

207. See United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37,49 (1878) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is the
duty of all courts ofjustice to take care .. . that hard cases do not make bad law.").
208. E.g., Wolpaw v. Comm'r, 47 F.3d 787, 792-93 (6th Cur. 1995) (contorting the rule
under I.R.C. § 6110 that private letter rulings are not precedential in order to give a particular
private letter ruling essentially precedential effect).
209. E.g., Walker v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 537, 550 (1993) (treating a prior revenue ruling
inconsistent with the IRS's current litigating position as a "concession" by the IRS in the case at
bar).
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Other arguments beyond those stated here could be asserted, but I have
doubts about them. For example, it is sometimes suggested that the IRS's
knowledge that it would be consistently held to its positions would encourage it
to think those positions through more carefully before taking an initial stance.2 1
That sounds plausible, but I doubt its "real world" viability.2 1'1 Extensive
internal controls and reviews are already in place within the IRS, and the IRS is
well aware of the professional and political heat it endures when it takes
controversial positions. Despite these, of course, the IRS does sometimes "get it
wrong," but that is rarely because it was cavalier or felt insufficient incentive to
try to get it right. In short, I suspect that the extent to which a rigorous
consistency doctrine would actually increase the clarity of the IRS's initial
analysis would be at or near zero.
B. Theoretical Superiorityof the "No Duty " View to the "Strong Duty"
View
The appeal of the "strong duy' view derives from deeply felt and
ennobling conceptions of fairness.' Human beings naturally aspire to see
justice prevail, and only those who are morally dead can view with unruffled
serenity instances where the IRS treats similarly-situated taxpayers differently.
Thus, opponents of the "strong duty" view bear the burden of showing that a
robust and judicially enforceable duty of IRS consistency would entail such
grave harms that they override the fairness arguments.
It may well be, however, that this burden can be met. Sometimes the head
must overrule the heart. The Roman maxim "let justice be done though the

heavens should

fall",214

is exhilarating, but it is merely aspirational and never

has been nor will be an operational principle of any modern legal system. Many
features of our legal system-statutes of limitations for example-undoubtedly
persist because other policy
thwart justice in many cases but nonetheless
215
considerations situationally trump fairness.
210. This idea derives from a comparable rationale for the contra proferentem; canon for
interpreting contracts. See, e.g., Banks v. Banks, 648 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Miss. 1994).
211. To take a parallel, textual or literal approaches to statutory interpretation are
sometimes defended on the ground that legislatures-knowing that the courts will not bail them
out of drafting mistakes-will engage in better drafting. Although this notion has been around
for a long time, see, e.g., THEODORE SEDOwicKA TREATISE ON THE RuLEs WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTON OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

314 (2d

Pomeroy ed. 1874), there seems to be little historical confirmation of this effect.
212. Moreover, in some instances, too much deliberation maybe almost as bad as too little.
See, e.g., Sam Young & Lee A. Sheppard, FinancialProducts Official Wants FasterLetter
Ruling Process, 17 TAX Nom~s 209, 209 (2007) (noting complaints that IRS rulings for financial
products and transactions often arrive too late to be useful).
213. See supraPartlIV.A.l.
214. "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum."
215. This is true in all areas of law, certainly including tax. "Tax law, after all, is not
normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities." United
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There are four arguments against a "strong duty" position: (1) ajudiciallycreated and enforced consistency doctrine may be constitutionally illegitimate
as violative of the separation of powers principle; (2) the consistency doctrine
can overcorrect, giving taxpayers not justice but windfalls; (3) a fully robust
consistency duty would undercut effective tax-law administration; and (4)
resolving cases on consistency grounds could deprive the system of substantive
contributions by the courts.
1. Separation of Powers
There are two questions in every legal dispute: (1) what is the good or right
outcome?; and (2) is the particular body hearing the matter empowered to
decree that outcome? Even if one were to conclude that fairness trumps all
countervailing policies, one would still have to ask whether it is constitutional
for courts to impose a fairness-based rule to alter the result that would
otherwise occur under the tax statutes enacted by Congress.
It is not easy to reconcile a judicial consistency doctrine with the separation
of powers principle. Under our Constitution, Congress is authorized to make
the tax laws, not the courts.21 The Treasury Department is authorized to engage
in interstitial tax law making, but only as a result of congressional delegation of
power. 2 17 If, because of the judicially-created consistency doctrine, a taxpayer
wins a case that they would have lost under the statute, the court has altered the
outcome that Congress decreed. This result is hard to reconcile with the
legislature's undoubted primacy in taxation.21
The consistency doctrine bears a familial relationship to the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. But "it is well settled that the Government may not be
estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.",2 '9 Although the Supreme
Court has "barely" left the door open "that estoppel might be available in the
States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997). A softer view of the matter was offered by an
early circuit court case: "Taxation is a matter of statutes, and equitable considerations cannot
override the provisions of the statutes, nor always supply their omnissions. Nevertheless honesty,
good faith, and consistency are due in tax accounting. The right and wrong of things and
equitable principles have a place in tax matters." Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 622,
622-23 (5th Cir. 1938) (citations omitted).

216.

U.S. CONST.

art. 1, § 8, ci. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect

Taxes.")
217. Either under specific delegations, such as I.R.C. §§ 385(a), 469(o, and 1502, or under
the general delegation of I.R.C. § 7805(a). See also I.R.C. § 78011(a) (2006) (delegating to the
Treasury Department authority to administer and enforce the Internal Revenue Code).
218. See, e.g., Am. Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 697 (1961) (referring to
"the long-established policy of the Court in deferring, where possible, to congressional
procedures in the tax field").
219. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51,60 (1984); see
also Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383-84 & n.11(1947); cf FDIC v. Harrison,
735 F.2d 408, 411-12 (11 th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that estoppel notions should not be asserted
against the Government for activities arising out of the exercise of its sovereign powers).
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rare case," it "has never upheld a lower court opinion that applied equitable
estoppel .. against the government, and it has come close to saying that
equitable estoppel is never available against the government. 22 0 Specifically,
many courts have held that equitable estoppel is rarely, if ever, available against
the IRS. 22'
The Supreme Court's decision in Office of Personnel Management v
Richmond,'2 72 a non-tax case, is instructive. A retired Navy employee was
receiving a disability annuity from the Government, and to remain eligible, he
needed his other income to stay below a statutory ceiling. 2 The retiree
received erroneous oral and written information from Navy employee relations
personnel, and as a result of following it, his income exceeded the ceiling and
the
he was ruled ineligible for continued receipt of the annuity. 224 He appealed 225
ruling, and the circuit court ruled in his favor based on equitable estoppel.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed.2 2 Although it "[left] for another
22 7
day whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed against the Government,"
the Court noted that "[flrom our earliest cases, we have recognized that
equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private
litigants

2 28

and that "we have reversed every finiding of estoppel that we have

area
reviewed. Indeed, no less than three of our most recent decisions in this
229
have been summary reversals of decisions upholding estoppel claims."1
Importantly, the Richmond Court anchored its holding in a separation of
powers provision .2 30 The Appropriations Clause provides: "No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law,"23 and Congress, of course, makes those appropriations. 3 Under the
applicable statute, the retiree was not entitled to the annuity, and the Court held
220. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADmiNIsTRATIvE LAW 48 (2008).
221. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-76 (1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v.
Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Estate of Carberry v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d
Cir. 1991); Estate of Guenzel v. Comm'r, 258 F.2d 248,253 (8th Cir. 1958); Willis v. Dep't of
Treasury, IRS, 848 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). A number of lower court cases have
held that equitable estoppel may be asserted against the IRS. E.g., Tonkonogy v. United States,
417 F. Supp. 78, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Hollenbeck, 166 B.R. 291, 295-96 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1993). These cases are controversial, however. See generally SALTzmAN, supra note 87,$~
1.06[4] (discussing equitable estoppel in tax).
222. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), rev'g 862 F.2d 294 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
223. Id. at 416.
224. Id. at 417-18.
225. Id. at 418.
226. Id at 434.
227. Id. at 423.
228. Id. at 419.
229. Id. at 422.
230. Id at 423-24.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
232. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424.
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cannot grant [the retiree]
that "judicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel
233
a money remedy that Congress has not authorized.
The logic of Richmond also applies to a judicially-created and enforced
duty of consistency on the IRS. As seen in the Adam and Eve example in Part
1,23' a duty of consistency matters only in cases where the IRS's adjustment for
the second taxpayer is correct under the substantive law. For a court to
nonetheless hold for the taxpayer would override the tax statute as surely as
finding in favor of the retiree in Richmond would have overridden the annuity
statute. The separation of powers principle is traduced equally in the two
contexts.
2. Windfalls to Taxpayers
The duty of consistency can be a blunt instrument, overcorrecting so that
taxpayers are not simply made whole but receive windfalls. When a taxpayer
prevails in court on consistency grounds, they win the whole case. The taxpayer
will have to pay neither the deficiency nor interest on the deficiency for the
item at issue.
This can overcorrect in two ways. First, two classes of taxpayers occupy
different situations regarding IRS inconsistency. One class consists of taxpayers
who were aware of the IRS's initial position and specifically relied on it in
planning their transactions. The other class was unaware of the initial position
and did not rely on it; taxpayers of this class discovered the IRS's inconsistency
only as a happy accident during trial preparation.
The fairness argument is stronger for the reliance based class than the nonreliance based class 235 because the fairness concern is most significant when
reliance is present.23 Yet, as usually framed, the consistency duty does not
consist of a reliance element. Thus, taxpayers in the non-reliance class could
prevail just as often as those in the reliance class. For taxpayers in the former,
their victory would more resemble a windfall than a necessary concomitant of
justice.
Second, there is an aspect of windfall even for taxpayers who acted in
reliance on the IiRS's initial position. In consistency situations, the IRS's initial
position presumably was wrong under the substantive law, whereas its
233. Id at 426; see also INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) ("[Ilt is well
established that courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements
and provisions than can courts of law." (quoting Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192
(1893))).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
235. See, e.g., Bookwalter v. Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78, 84 (8th Cir. 1966) (distinguishing,
for consistency purposes, between taxpayers who had applied for and received IRS rulings and
taxpayers who had not).
236. Cf. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12
(1984) (noting "the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new rule
retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests").
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subsequent, inconsistent position was correct. Had the second taxpayer properly
followed the law (instead of the IRS's erroneous initial interpretation of the
law), their filed return would have reported a higher tax liability and, therefore,
entailed no deficiency. Thus, excusing the taxpayer's deficiency as a result of a
consistency based decision would place the taxpayer in a better position than
the law intended.
3. Tax Administration
A rule of consistency would be particularly troublesome if it was triggered
by lower-level IRS actions and positions-those lower in status than
regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices. 3 If a judicial
consistency duty were recognized, a choice would have to be made on the types
of actions and positions that would trigger the duty. Would the IRS be
precluded from taking a later position at variance with any type of action or
position?
Most supporters of a judicially enforceable consistency duty would allow
some lower-level IRS actions and positions to act as consistency triggers.23
There are at least three problems with extending a consistency duty to those
lower levels. First, lower-level IRS actions do not have precedential status.23
Why then should they be consistency triggers? For example, in a non-tax case,
the Supreme Court rejected a complaint that the current position of a federal
agency was inconsistent with prior positions taken in low-level agency
pronouncements .24 0 The Court stated in part that the prior positions were too
24
informal "to establish a binding agency policy."1 1
Second, the effect of a consistency requirement on the IRS's willingness to
provide guidance should be considered. To take a parallel, the general rule is
in
that the courts, in reviewing IRS determinations, will ignore defects 242
following the Internal Revenue Manual leading up to these determinations .
The courts reason that to hold otherwise would discourage the IRS from
instituting procedures in the first place.24 It is better that the IRS establishes
internal rules that it usually follows than be deterred from establishing rules at
all . 244 The number of annual rulings issued by the IRS is already at a low level
237. For description of the types of Treasury and IRS actions and positions, see supra Part
II.B.
238. E.g., Zelenak, supra note 81, at 433-48 (arguing that private letter rulings should be
used as triggers).
239. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61 10(j)(3) (2006) (private letter rulings "may not be used or cited as
precedent"); Treas. Reg. § 601 .201(l)(1) (2009).
240. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 743 (1996).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979).
243. See id. at 756.
244. See, e.g., id.; Riland v. Commn'r, 79 T.C. 185, 200-02 (1982); see Steve Johnson, A
Residual DamagesRight Against the IRS: A Cure Worse than the Disease,88 TAX NOTES 395,
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according to historical standards. 4 Requiring private letter rulings and other
types of guidance to be sources of required consistency might make them less
attractive and exacerbate the situation. These sources of guidance are important
to the health of the system. Thus, a strong consistency rule could establish
incentives adverse to sound tax administration.
Third, the effect the consistency requirement would have on the
manageability of tax litigation also merits consideration. If all types of IRS
actions qualified as consistency triggers, taxpayers' counsel would have a large
incentive to routinely and exhaustively seek information on prior IRS actions
during discovery. Judges would have to wade through consistency debates in
discovery disputes collateral to the underlying substance of the tax issues. 4
Limiting consistency triggers to a small and defined set of sources would curb
both litigation costs and inconvenience to the parties and the courts.
4. Judicial Contributions to the Development of Substantive Tax Law
Resolving a tax case solely on the procedural ground of IRS inconsistency
would eliminate the necessity of reviewing the substantive merits of the parties'
positions. In some instances, eradicating the court's view could hamper the
sound development of substantive tax law. Here are five examples:
(1) In Haley Bros. Construction Corp. v. Commissioner, the tax court
considered rules governing eligibility for S corporation status. 247 The court
noted that the IRS's position in the case was inconsistent with prior revenue
rulings. 4 Nonetheless, the court held for the IRS because it concluded that the
rulings were incorrect under the statute. 249 The IRS has since acknowledged
and discussed Haley in subsequent guidance and rulings. 5
406-07 (2000).
245. See, e.g, Marion Marshall, Sheryl Stratton & Christopher Bergin, The Changing
Landscape of IRS Guidance: A Downward Slope, 90 TAX Noms 673 (2001) (tracking twenty
years of declining issuance of traditional guidance by the IRS). The IRS has more recently
touted resurgence of the number of rulings issued, but the extent of the improvement is open to
question. See Is IRS PaddingStatistics on Revenue Rulings?,99 J.TAX'N 256, 256 (2003). For
statistics, see Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, DiscardedDeference: JudicialIndependence in

Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN.

L. REV.

1, 3 (2006).

246. Most courts have been unreceptive to consistency-motivated taxpayer demands for
discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1979); Vons Cos. v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 4-5 (2001); Penn-Field Indus. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 720, 720-21 (1980);
Davis v. Comm'r (Davis fl), 69 T.C. 716, 7 19-20 (1978); Davis v. Comm'r (Davis 1), 65 T.C.
1014, 102 1-22 (1976); see also supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
247. Haley Bros. Constr. Corp. v. Cornm'r, 87 T.C. 498 (1986).
248. Id. at 516-17.
249. Id.
250. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1993 WL 1469418 (Aug. 30, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
92-15-039 (Apr. 10, 1992); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,768 (Dec. 9, 1988); I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 88-37-003 (Sept. 16, 1988).
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(2) In Commissionerv. Schlieer, the Supreme Court revisited § 104(a)(2,
which excludes damages received due to physical injury from gross income.P1
Previously, this provision had produced many irreconcilable and unsatisfactory
decisions.25 A major cause of the problem was an outdated, but still in-effect,
253
regulation. Holding the Government to its prior position on the regulation
would likely have led to a decision for the taxpayer 154 -ad perpetuated the
unsatisfactory status quo. Unfazed by the consistency concern,2 5 the Court held
for the Government2 1 after accepting its "reinterpretation" of the regulation,
and gave hope that § 104(a)(2) law could develop in a more satisfactory
the following year, Congress amended and improved §
direction. Indeed,
25
104(a)(2). 1
(3) In Dickman v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court considered whether
no-interest or low-interest loans can give rise to federal gift tax liability. 258 The
taxpayer argued that prior to 1966 the IRS had not asserted this liability and
that its revised position was an impermissible departure from its prior
practice . 25 9 After briefly remarking that it was not certain that the IRS had
changed its position, the Court rejected the taxpayer's consistency argument as
a matter of law .260 Thus, free to consider the merits, the Supreme Court held for
the IRS .26 ' This closed a loophole in the gift tax and was one of the catalysts for
addresses the income,
the enactment of Code § 7872, which comprehensively
262
estate, and gift tax effects of low-interest loans.
(4) When a taxpayer fails to pay duly-determined tax liabilities, § 6321
provides that the unpaid amounts "shall be a lien in favor of the [Government]
251.

Comm'r v. Schlieer, 515 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1995).

252. See generally J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of/EmploymentRelatedPersonalInjury Awards. The Need/or Limits, 50 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1989) (discussing
the problematic history of § 104(a)(2) and its application).
253. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333.
254. The taxpayer raised the consistency argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-25,
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (No. 94-500), 1995 WL 242273, at *24-25; Brief for the Respondents at
32-33, Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (No. 94-500), 1995 WL 60725.
255. Schleier, 5i5 U.S. at 333-34.
256. Id. at 337.
257. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110
Stat. 1755, 1838. But see J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding
PersonalInjury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 McmNr. L. REv. 167, 167 (1997)
(arguing that the amendment was "understandable, but fundamentally incorrect").
258. Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 331 (1984).
259. Id. at 342-43.
260. "[I]t is well established that the Commissioner may change an earlier interpretation of
the law, even if such a change is made retroactive in effect. This rule applies even though a
taxpayer may have relied to his detriment upon the Commissioner's prior position." Id. at 343
(citations omitted).
26 1. Id.at 344.
262. See, e.g., Amber Becton, Comnment, Taxation oflntrafamily Transfers: Problems and
ProposedSolutions, 76 TENN. L. Rnv. 771, 779-8 1 (2009); see also I.R.C. § 7872 (2006).
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upon all propert and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
[the taxpayer].%6 Despite the sweeping language of § 632 1,'264 and the fact that
state law exemptions do not limit federal tax collection, 26 5 nearly unanimous
lower-court case law held that the tax lien did not attach to tenancy-by-theentirety interests when state law exempts these interests from the reach of

private creditors.26

This rule never made doctrinal sense,2 6 and the Supreme Court overruled it
in United States v. Craft.2 6 The strongest argument advanced by the Craft
dissenters was that the IRS itself had accepted the old rule in a number of its
manuals, advisories, and bulletins. 26 ' Thankfully, the Craft majority ignored
this fact. Had the Court ruled adversely to the IRS on consistency grounds, the
old, anomalous, and undesirable rule would have continued to confound federal

2 69
tax collection.

(5) Section 162(a)(2) allows taxpayers away from home in pursuit of trade
or business to deduct their reasonable travel expenses, including meals and
lodging. 270 In Rosenspan v. United States, the Second Circuit considered
deductions for meal and lodging expenses incurred on the road by a traveling
salesman who had an office but did not have an abode . 27 1 For many years, the
IRS had interpreted "home" for § 162(a)(2) purposes as one's tax home, i.e.,
one's principal place of business. 7 The salesman argued that based on that
definition he should prevail. 273
27
However, the Second Circuit held against the taxpayer.2 7 The court
correctly observed that the IRS's "tax home" position ran contrary to traditional
canons of statutory interpretation 275 adviolated sound policy. 26Accordingly,
263.

I.R.C. § 6321 (2006).

264. See Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945) ("Stronger language
could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes.").
265. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722-23 (1985).
266. For criticism of the old rule, see Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Like ly Attachment
of the FederalTax Lien to Tenancy-by-the-EntiretiesInterests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163 (2000); Steve
R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in Post-DryeTax Lien Analysis, 5 FLA. TAX RE..
415, 442-52 (2002).
267. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002).
268. See id. at 299-300, 300 n.9 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent somewhat overstates
the alleged uniformity of the IRS's acceptance of the old cases.
269. For discussion of Craft, see Steve R. Johnson, After Craft: Implementation Issues, 96
TAx Nom~s 553 (2002); Steve R. Johnson, Why CraftIsn 't Scary, 37 REAL PROP. PRoB. & TR. J.
439 (2002); Steve R. Johnson, The Tax Lien and Entireties Interests: Evaluating the IRS's

Implementation of Craft, CommuN. TAX L. REP., Spring/Summer 2004, at 1.
270. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2006).
271. Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 907 (1971).
272. E.g., Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60.
273. Rosenspan, 438 F.2d at 907.
274. Idat 912.
275. "When Congress uses such a non-technical word [as 'homne'] in a tax statute,
presumably it wants administrators and courts to read it in the way that ordinary people would
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the court held that the statutory term "home" means "abode," not "business
headquarters. 2 17 At the margins, this area of deductions remains
controversial, 7 but Rosenspan continues to be a key'case in generating thought
about the area and administering the deductions. 7
The contributions of cases like Haley Bros., Schier,Dickman, Craft, and
Rosenspan to the positive evolution of the substantive tax law would not have
occurred had these cases been resolved adversely to the Government on a
consistency rationale. This implicates what has been called the collaborative
approach to statutory interpretation .280 Good taxation is an art-an exceedingly
difficult art involving numerous fiscal, economic, social, and political
complexities. Legislators and administrators (as well as taxpayers' advisors)
play the principal roles, but the quality of our tax rules can be improved
through judges' intellectual contributions. We should preserve this possibility.
C. Theoretical Superiorityof the "No Duty" View to Current "Weak
Duty" Views
Part JII.C.3 identified four "weak duty" views that have been offered in
cases, IRS guidance, or commentary. All have disadvantages that disqualify
them as general solutions to the consistency conundrum.

Id. at 911. For additional support of the "ordinary meaning" canon, see
understand .
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995); FDIC v. Meyer, 5 10 U.S. 471, 476
(1994); Comm'r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993); Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23,28
(1987) (quoting Felix Frankf'urter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLIJm. L.
REv. 527, 536 (1947)).
276. The court noted that the purpose of the deduction is to alleviate the burden of
duplicative expenses. Rosenspan, 438 F.2d at 912. Since Rosenspan had an office but was not
paying for a house or apartment, his hotel expenses were not duplicative housing costs. Id.
277. The court explained its reasoning: "Proper analysis of the problem has been
beclouded, and the Government's position in this case has been made more difficult than it need
be, by the [IRS's] insistence that 'home' means 'business headquarters,' despite the Supreme
Court's having thrice declined to endorse this, and its rejection by several courts of appeals." Id.
at 9 10-11 (citations omitted).
278. See, e.g., Stokes v. Comm'r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2886 (1992), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1098 (11Ith
Cir. 1994); Kennedy v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 332 (1987).

279. See, e.g., BORIS 1.BInrKER & MARTN J. McMAHON,
OF INDIVIDUALS

JR., FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION

13.1[5] (2d ed. 1995).

280. See generally William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 541 (1988) (discussing the interplay between public
deliberation and judicial interpretation in law making). But cf. Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[A]gencies and courts together constitute a
'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest, and are 'collaborative instrumentalities of
(quoting
justice.' The court is in a real sense part of the total administrative process ...
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 379 F.2d 153, 160 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1967))).
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1. A Duty if the IRS Has Discretion
As previously mentioned, one suggested approach is to require IRS
consistency in those situations where the IRS has discretion in making or
applying the tax law, but not require consistency where it lacks discretion.2 8
More often than not, the tax law is non-discretionary, but the IRS probably has
more discretion than is usually acknowledged.
Nonetheless, linking mandatory consistency to the degree of administrative
discretion would be problematic. First, a distinction should be drawn between
rulemaking discretion and rule-application discretion. Most of the examples of
administrative discretion described in Part II.C.3.a entail discretion available to
Treasury when drafting regulations. Once regulations have been written, they
typically have the force of law and the IRS does not have discretion to flout or
revise them during an audit, administrative appeal, or litigation of any

taxpayer's case.28
Second, this approach is an invitation to both unproductive wrangling over
collateral issues and grave unpredictability. Discretion is not a binary concept.
It is not the case that Treasury and the IRS either have discretion or don't;
rather, each has greater or lesser degrees of discretion in various contexts.
Therefore, under this approach, courts would first have to quantify the degree
of discretion in a given situation and then hold the IRS to a matching degree of
mandatory consistency along a spectrum from "very great discretion therefore
very great consistency" to "no discretion therefore no required consistency,"
with untold numbers of calibrations in between. As a practical matter, litigants
could not confidently predict where the courts would come out in actual cases.
One of the worst aspects of the status quo is its unpredictability, which this
approach would only perpetuate.
2. A Duty of IRS Factual Representations Only
In a low-level internal memorandum the IRS accepted that it is subject to a
duty of consistency mirroring the elements of the taxpayer duty of consistency
for representations of fact.2 This was neither a generous concession nor a
worthwhile solution to the consistency problem.
The IRS rarely makes representations of fact to taxpayers. Because the
taxpayers were parties to the transactions at issue, they are the ones in a
position to make factual representations. The IRS rarely has first-hand
knowledge of the relevant events, and, thus, cannot and will not make factual
representations. IRS inconsistencies typically involve interpretations of law,
and this approach would provide no relief in these situations. A "no duty"
position at least forthrightly states that IRS inconsistency is not actionable. This

281.
282.
283.

See supra Part III.C.3.a.
See infra text accompanying notes 333-38.
See supra Part III.C.3.b.

20101

2010]
AN IRS D UTY OF CONSISTENCY60

605

is preferable to a "no duty" result accomplished "through the back door"acknowledging a duty that has no practical application or real weight behind it.
3. A Duty to Explain or Repudiate
Another alternative is to generally apply to the IRS the rule that applies to
administrative aecs.284 That is, when inconsistency is alleged, the IRS
would be required to explain why its positions are consistent or to provide a
good reason for departing from the earlier position, such as a reasoned change
of policy or repudiation of the earlier position as erroneous.
There are appealing aspects of this approach. The tax world-like most
specialties, I suppose-occasionally trends towards undesirable exceptionalism.
I believe that rules of tax procedure should parallel rules of procedure
generally, absent some substantial reason for departure. 8
However, there probably are good reasons for departure in this context.
First, I have described "explain or repudiate" as a "weak duty" view, but a
"hybrid" view may be more accurate. When the explanation or repudiation is
not given, this approach morphs into a "strong duty" view since the entire IRS
adjustment is defeated. But, when the explanation or repudiation is given, it
morphs into a "no duty" view because the taxpayer receives no relief, except,
perhaps, some sense of moral vindication. Thus, in every case, this approach
will exhibit the disadvantages of one of the polar views.
Second, the press of litigation is not a good scenario for the Government to
undertake comprehensive reevaluations of tax policy-and only reevaluations
of this quality offer "explain or repudiate" appeal. Careful policy reappraisals
should be made in a reflective and, if needed, unhurried fashion, not under
court imposed deadlines during progressive litigation. An explanation or
repudiation that emerges from a rushed or incomplete analysis could hinder the
coherence of the tax law rather than help it.
Third, allowing taxpayers to discover private letter rulings and comparable
documents as ammunition for consistency arguments would create serious
privacy concerns. There is a strong policy in favor of preserving the

284. See supra Part III.C.3.c.
285. Compare David A. Hyman, When Rules Collide: ProceduralIntersection and the
Rule ofLaw, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1389 (1997) (arguing that general law concepts should more fully
inform the rules on IRS summonses), with Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power andthe Limits
of Theory: A Reply to ProfessorHyman, 71 Tin.. L. REv. 1705, 1724-27 (1997) (maintaining
that Hyman's approach pays insufficient heed to important differences between tax and other
contexts). See also Kristin E. Hickman, The Needfor Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
JudicialDeference, 90 MiNN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (arguing that tax does not and should not
have a different deference standard than all other administrative law); Leo R. Martinez, The
Summons Power and Tax Court Di:wovery: A Different Perspective, 13 VA. TAx REv. 731,733
(1994) (arguing that all "information obtained pursuant to legitimate exercise of the summons
power should be allowed in the Tax Court").
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confidentiality of taxpayer information, a policy codified in several sections of
the Internal Revenue Code.2 8
Privacy protections could create a dilemma under a consistency duty. In at
least some cases, redacted information could be significant in deciding whether
the taxpayer seeking the information is truly situated similarly to the taxpayer in
the ruling. Withholding the information could make it difficult for the taxpayer
to plausibly assert that there is a consistency issue or, conversely, could deny
the IRS the means to explain why two ostensibly similar situations actually are
distinguishable. On the other hand, exposing the redacted information would
undercut the established policy of confidentiality, compromising the privacy of
a taxpayer who is oblivious to the instant controversy,287 and, in turn, possibly
undercutting voluntary compliance.2 8
.Fourth, the analogy between tax cases and non-tax administrative law
cases-the grounds from which "explain or repudiate" sprouts-is inexact.
Many of the non-tax administrative law cases involve the application of both
agency golicy and discretion; situations where the agency has effectively made
the law. 89In contrast, although Treasury and the IRS have greater latitude for
action than is sometimes acknowledged, 29 0 it remains true that the IRS is
usually applying law made by Congress rather than law made by itself. In these
cases, if the IRS cannot satisfactorily "explain" and is "bound" to its previous
position, it is the will of Congress-the constitutionally responsible actor-that
is being thwarted by application of a judicial consistency rule.
4. A Duty Under Amended § 7805(b)
Again, as previously described, Professor Pietruszkiewicz has proposed
amending § 7805(b) to broaden the scope of review and adopt a uniform
standard of abuse of discretion applicable to consistency cases. If I read his
proposal correctly, it has some common ground with the proposal advanced in
Part VI of this article. Both proposals involve amending portions, albeit
different portions, of the Internal Revenue Code. This would avoid the
286. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 6103, 6105, 6110(c), 7213A, 7216 (2006).
287. See, e.g., Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. United States, No. 1:07-C V-88, 2008
WL 4865566, at *2-3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2008) (rejecting on § 6103 grounds an attempt to
discover settlement documents betwveen the IRS and third parties, specifically rejecting the
attempt to expand an exception to confidentiality under § 6103(h)(4)(C)).
288. It is widely believed that preserving the confidentiality of taxpayer information
E.g., OFFICE OF TAx POLICY, DEP'TOF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON SCOPE ANDtUSE OF TAxPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS, VOLumE 1:
STUDY OF GENERAL PROVISIONS 34 (2000); PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY
TN AN INFORmATION SOCITY 540 (1977). But see Stephen W.Mazza, Taxpayer Privacyand Tax

promotes compliance.

Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 1065, 1070-76 (2003) (questioning the asserted relationship).
289. See, e.g., INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485, 49 1-93 (1947).
290. See supra Part III.C.1.
29 1. See supra notes 170-74.
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separation of powers problem 92 and the futility of continued reliance on
common law. Also, both proposals are premised on the belief that some of the
"strong duty" cases have gone too far and that a "weak duty" approach offers
the best prospects of success.
However, the "amend § 7805(b)" approach apparently '4ould use lowerlevel IRS positions, such as private letter rulings, as consistency triggers, 9
which would absolve the taxpayer of all liability-deficiency as well as interest.
These aspects would render this approach susceptible to three of the problems
inherent in the "strong duty" view as described in Part 1V.B. First, elimination
of the entire deficiency would give the taxpayrer a windfall compared to
taxpayers who properly reported their liabilities.2 Second, this elimination on
the procedural ground of consistency would deprive the system of useful
contributions by the courts to the development of the substantive tax law.2 9
Third, designating private letter rulings and other lower-level IRS guidance as
consistency triggers would create a disincentive for the IRS to provide
guidance, imperiling an important avenue for taxpayer service and responsible
tax planning.
'

V. THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF THE "NO DUTY" VIEW
In Part IV, I asserted that, from a purely theoretical or doctrinal perspective,
the "no duty" view is the best view to the consistency problem among the
approaches that have been offered to date. But public policy is not a matter
solely of theory and doctrine. The lesson of experience is clear that no single
view, including the "no duty" view, is likely to become and remain settled
doctrine as long as tax consistency remains a province of the common law.
Exploring the reasons for this state of affairs will help us to craft a better
solution. Three reasons predominate: (1) the ingrained habits of American
judges; (2) time and resource limitations on lawyers, judges, and their clerks;
and (3) the inherent difficulty of the consistency issues, especially insofar as
they entail conflict between the head and the heart.
A. In grainedJudicialHabits
One of the enduring themes of law is the push-and-pull between clarity and
nuance. The struggle plays out on well-worn fields such as "defined elements
versus all facts and circumstances" and "rules versus standards. 29 7 Of course,
See supra Part IV.B. 1.
See Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 9, at 562-69.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supraPart IV.B3.4.
See supra text accompanying notes 242-45.
See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-31 (196 1); RIcHAIW A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-5 3 (1990); Ronald MADworkin, The Model ofRules, 35
U. Cmn. L. Rrv. 14,22-29 (1967); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
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reasonably clear rules do sometimes emanate from common law judging, but it
remains true that American judges often exhibit fear of commitmentreluctance to unequivocally embrace firm rules. At least part of the reason for
this reluctance is the desire ofjudges to retain maximum freedom of maneuver,
that is, to avoid laying down a rule in today's case that may prove an obstacle in
reaching the result the judge may desire in tomorrow's case.29
Against this background, reluctance to commit to a firm IRS consistency
rule is no more surprising than judges' behavior in other contexts. In Part
IV.B. 1, we rehearsed the Supreme Court's bringing itself to the brink of
declaring that equitable estoppel cannot be applied against government
agencies but being unwilling to cross that Rubicon.
300
A similar battle with a similar result was waged in Chevron Step Zero.30
Justice Scalia has repeatedly urged the Court to adopt a clear rule for when
Chevron applies and when it does not. He has been unsuccessful. Writing for
the majority in a key post-Chevron case, Justice Souter summarized his
attempts: "Justice Scalia's first priority over the years has been to limit and
simplify. The Court's choice has been to tailor deference to variety. This
acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to recognize
Justice Scalia bemoaned
more than one variety of judicial deference . .
his defeat: "The Court has largely replaced Chevron . .. with that test most
beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants
who want to know what to expect): th' ol' 'totality of the circumstances'

test." 30

2

B. Time and Resource Limitations
Most of the consistency decisions-regardless of which view they
ultimately espouse-are of distressingly low quality. The barren sands are
relieved by relatively few oases.30 Most of the cases do not acknowledge
(1995). A major recent example of the clash is the "uniformity versus discretion" controversy
over the wisdom of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., JOHN A. TOWNSEND,
LARRY A. CAMPAGNA, STEvE JOHNSON & Scorr A. SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMEs ch. 10 (2008).
298. This is part of the explanation for the fuzziness of appellate review standards. For
discussion of these standards in tax, see Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Conflating Standards
of Review in the Tax Court: A Lesson in Ambiguity, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1337 (2008) (tracing the
history of the standard of review in tax court and arguing for a more traditional approach);
Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the Standardof Review, 60 ALA. L.
REv. 339, 360-65 (2009).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 2 19-35.
300. The question of whether Chevron applies to a given case is logically anterior to
Chevron's two steps and, thus, has been called "Step Zero." E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006).
301. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236-37 (2001).
302. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
303. Among the best of the recent consistency opinions is Vons Cos. v. United States, 51
Fed. Cl. 1 (2001).
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(much less carefully evaluate) the numerous cases reaching different results,
nor do they identify (much less deeply analyze) more than one or two of the
competing values discussed in Part IV.
Particularly striking is the failure of many "strong duty" cases to explain
their result in light of earlier Supreme Court decisions. In a 1936 case, the
Supreme Court held that the IRS could effectively make a new regulation
retroactive that increased tax liability above that created under a prior
regulation because the the old regulation was an erroneous interpretation of the

statute . 3 04 The Court explained its decision:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to
make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power
to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by
operates to create a rule
the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but
305
out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.
If a prior IRS position incorrectly applying the Internal Revenue Code is "a
mere nullity," it is hard to comprehend how it can be the basis on which the
IRS's subsequent correct application of the Code will be estopped.
Later, a 1957 case dealt with the IRs retroactive revocation of erroneous
rulings on which the taxpayer had relied to its detriment .3 06 The taxpayer
argued that the IRS should be equitably estopped from this practice. 0 The
Court disagreed: "This argument is without merit. The doctrine of equitable
estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of
law."30
In 1965, the Supreme Court endorsed these previous cae 309 Itstated that
"the Commissioner's acquiescence in an erroneous decision, published as a
ruling, cannot in and of itself bar the United States from collecting a tax
otherwise lawfully due,"3 10 and noted that this principle, applicable to
regulations, "applies with even greater force" to IRS positions below the level
of regulations."
Finally, in a 1984 case, the taxpayers complained that the IRS had not
orn interest-free
previoUSly interpreted the Code to impose gift tax liability
loans 1 The taxpayers argued that it was "manifestly unfair to permit the

304. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936).
305. Id at 134.
306. Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commn'r, 353 U.S. 180, 181 (1957) (disapproving Stockstrom
v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 195 1)).
307. Id. at 183.

308. Id.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965).
Id. at 73.
Idat75.
Dickmnan v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 342 (1984).
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Commissioner to impose the gift tax on the transactions challenged here." 3
Citing the 1957 and 1965 cases described above, the Supreme Court rejected
this argument:
[Ilt is well established that the Commissioner may change an earlier
interpretation of the law, even if such a change is made retroactive in effect.
This rule applies even though a taxpayer may have relied to his detriment
upon the Commissioner's prior position. The Commissioner is under no duty
position as soon as the statute authorizes such an
to assert a particular
314

interpretation.

Frankly, it is hard for me to see how the "strong duty" view squares with
this tetralogy of Supreme Court cases, although motivated counsel surely would
attempt more or less plausibly to distinguish them. 1 In any event, I am making
a more modest point here, a point about the quality (or lack thereof) of recent
opinions written in consistency cases. These are the Supreme Court's most
nearly relevant decisions. 3 16 One would expect that a court claiming to have the
power to void statutorily correct IRS positions based on a common law doctrine
would feel compelled to deal in some way with the Supreme Court's position.
Yet many of the "strong duty" cases mention only in passing or even entirely
317
ignore the Supreme Court tetralogy.
Perhaps the most benign explanation for these omissions is overwork. The
briefs written in consistency cases by busy lawyers with increasingly costconscious clients may fail to cite all the relevant case law and busy judges and
their busy clerks dealing with burgeoning case loads may lack the ability to
rectify the lawyers' omissions. If this is indeed the explanation, we can hardly
expect marked improvement in the quality of consistency decisions in the
future. The trends in both client constraints and workloads run in the opposite
direction.

313. Idat342-43.
314. Id at 343 (citations omitted). For additional discussion of Dickmnan, see supra text
accompanying notes 258-62.
315. For instance, one could point to changes in the delegation doctrine since 1936 and
assert contextual differences for the Auto Club, Dixon, and Dickmnan cases.
316. In contrast, the best Supreme Court support for the "strong duty" view is a brief
passage in a concurring opinion coming three years after the 1957 decision, five years before the
1965 decision, and 24 years before the 1984 decision. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299,
208 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
317. E.g., Rowe v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 13,20-26 (2007) (Gale, J., concurring); Rauenhorst
v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 168-73 (2002); Phillips v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 529, 534 (1987); Vesco
v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101, 129-30 (1979) (all cases failing to discuss any of the
decisions in the Supreme Court tetralogy).
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C. The Inherent Difficulty of the Issue
Even if future consistency cases were immaculately briefed, one could not
feel confident that all judges would reach the same result and settle upon a firm
rule. To an appreciable degree, choice among the competing views becomes a
value judgment, and not all human beings assign the same weights to various
values. In my constellation of values, the arguments favoring "no duty" are
stronger than those favoring a "strong duty," but others of at least equal
intelligence, moral sensitivity, and learning could discover that their scales of
318
values tip differently from mine.
This is well illustrated by the case law. Cases that have reflected on the
multiple conflicting policies plaguing the consistency issue have been marked
by vacillation, not resolution, as is exemplified by this excerpt from a tax court
consistency decision:
It has long been the position of this Court that our responsibility is to
apply the law to the facts of the case before us and determine the tax liability
of the parties before us; how the Commissioner may have treated other
taxpayers has generally been considered irrelevant in making that
determination. . .. Any change in that position would have widespread
ramifications in the administration and application of the Federal tax laws and
in the conduct of our work. . . . Although the implementation of [a
consistency duty] ... would present many problems, those problems may not
be insurmountable, and the notion of equal justice has strong appeal in our
society and might lead to the conclusion that [a consistency duty] should
ultimately be adopted. Yet, a full appreciation of the ramifications of this
matter makes abundantly clear that it should be approached cautiously. In
be
accordance with sound judicial administration, such a matter should only 319
considered when necessary to do so in order to decide the case before us.
In short, the inherent difficulty of the issues is too great to reasonably
expect that courts will blindly apply the "no duty" view or any other single
view. When the task involves making value judgments, Congress, not the
individual judge, is the more appropriate representative of society. If we are to
hope to eventually settle the IRS consistency controversy, we must look to

For example, Professor Hoffer supports a "strong duty" view because she believes that
"justice demands it." Hoffer, supra note 19, at 348-49. See generally Lynne N. Henderson,
318.

Legality and Empathy, 85 MicHi. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (rejecting the view that legality and
empathy are mutually exclusive concepts).

319.

Davis v. Comm'r (Davis 1), 65 T.C. 1014, 1022-23 (1976) (citations omitted); see

also Avers v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 678, 693 (1988) (stating that equal protection
violations through inconsistent settlement offers only occur where "discriminatory selection was
based on impermissible considerations or an arbitrary classification"); Jaggard v. Cormm'r, 76
T.C. 222, 226-27 (1981) (citing Davis 1, 65 T.C. 1014) (stating that lie Davis I, it is
unnecessary to decide whether there is a duty of consistency).
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statutes, not common law, and to an approach that achieves reasonable balance
among the competing considerations.
VI. PROPOSAL
A. Criteriafor an Effective Solution
The answer to the IRS consistency problem must be statutory. In an area as
positivistic as tax law, statutory mechanisms are generally preferable to
judicially-created regimes.3 2 In the consistency context, that general preference
is strongly reinforced by the failure of common law making to produce any
settled rule, much less a good rule. Furthermore, a statutory rule will avoid the
separation of powers concerns that arise from the Judicial Branch holding that
malfeasance by the Executive Branch trumps the tax outcomes decreed by the
Legislative Branch.
The contents of the statutory solution must take into account the competing
policies and values explored in Part IV and the sustainability concern addressed
in Part V. Thus, an effective statutory answer should advance rule of law values
and provide relief to taxpayers who deserve it, but not overcorrect by
benefitting undeserving taxpayers or benefitting deserving taxpayers in
excessive amounts. A sound statutory solution also should minimize any
adverse impact on tax administration and preserve the opportunity for courts to
contribute to the development of the substantive tax law. Finally, an effective
statutory answer must balance the competing concerns well enough to offer a
fair hope of sustainability.
B. Descriptionof the Proposal
My proposal involves relief in appropriate instances from interest liability
on tax underpayments. Code § 6601(a) provides that, in addition to the
principal amount of the deficiency and an y applicable penalties, the taxpayer is
liable for interest on tax underpayments. 21Interest is compounded daily, and

the rate broadly corresponds to prevailing market rates of interest. 322 However,
interest is not automatic. Section 6404 specifies a number of circumstances
320. See Johnson, The Taxpayer's Duty of Consistency,supra note 189, at 573 (suggesting
that statutory mitigation rules of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 should be applied over judicial duty of
consistency when both could apply to a given case); cf Benenson v. United States, 385 F.2d 26,
32-34 (2d Cir. 1967) (reaching the same result when mitigation rules and judicial doctrine of
equitable recoupment could overlap).
321. I.R.C. § 660 1(a) (2006). Penalties typically would not be in play in these cases. The
Code's accuracy-related penalties do not apply if there was reasonable cause for the return
position taken by the taxpayer and the taxpayer acted in good faith. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2006).
This standard surely is met when a taxpayer relied on an unrevoked regulation, revenue ruling,
or revenue procedure.
322. See I.R.C. §§ 1274 (d), 662 1(a)-(b) (2006).
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under which taxpayers may be relieved of interest liability on tax
underpayments. 2 None of the current circumstances cover the [RS
inconsistency addressed in this article.3 2
I advance the following proposal. Congress should amend Code § 6404 to
create a new circumstance where a taxpayer's liability for interest will be
abated. The amendment would provide for abatement of interest on any tax
underpayment when (1) the taxpayer's return position was consistent with a
regulation, revenue ruling, revenue procedure, or IRS notice on which (2) the
taxpayer relied in taking the return position, and that (3) the IRS withdrew or
chose not to follow after the return was filed. The amendment also would
provide that refusal by the IRS to effect this abatement is judicially reviewable
under a de novo standard. 2
One definitional nuance of this proposal involves regulations as consistency
triggers. A current area of major controvers y326.ivle the extent to which

Treasury regulations receive deference under the Chevron standard.3 12 1

It is

generally agreed that specific-authority tax regulations 328 are Chevron-qualified
but courts disagree on whether general-authority regulations are so qualified 126
30
or, instead, are governed by the putatively less deferential Skidmore standard.1
The majority view and the current trend is to treat general-authority Treasury
323. See infra text accompanying notes 369-72.
324. Although § 6404(f) addresses the abatement of penalties due to erroneous written
advice, it is only applicable to advice written to the individual taxpayer and not to prior rulings
or advice given to a different taxpayer.
325. The IRS currently has limited interest-abatement authority. Courts previously held
that the IRS's exercise or non-exercise of this authority was not judicially reviewable. E.g.,
Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 548, 554 (11 th Cir. 199 1). In 1996, Congress
enacted what is now § 6404(h) to give the tax court jurisdiction over actions challenging IRS
decisions not to abate interest. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 302(a), 110
Stat. 1452, 1457 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6404(h) (2006)). This jurisdiction is
exclusive. Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 506-08 (2007). For discussion of Hinck, see
Steve R. Johnson, Does the Tax Court Have Exclusive Jurisdictionto Review IRS Refusals to
Abate Interest Under J.R. C. § 6404?, 34 PREviEw U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 340 (2007); Steve R.

Johnson, Recent Supreme Court Cases Read Remedies Restrictively, A.B.A.

SEC. OF TAX'N

NEWS Q., Summer 2007, at 17.
326. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: JudicialReview of Tax Regulations, 3
FLA. TAX REv. 51, 52 (1996) (examining the extent to which Chevron has influenced judicial
review of tax regulations); David A. Brennan, Treasury Regulations and JudicialDeference in
the Post-ChevronEra, 13 GA. ST. U. L. Ray. 387(1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
followed Chevron with respect to Treasury regulatory interpretations); Mitchell M. Gans,

Deference andthe End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRt. J.731, 735, 775-85 (2002)
(arguing that Chevron deference should not apply in tax cases).
327. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
328. For description of specific-authority and general-authority tax regulations, see supra
text accompanying notes 132-40.
329. E.g., Stobie Creek Invs. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 668 (2008); Carlos v.
Comm'r, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004); Walton v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 589, 597 (2000).
330. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
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regulations as Chevron-qualified;3 3 ' however, some opinions are to the
contrary.3 3 Federal deference doctrine is hardly a model of clarity, 3 but
probably depends
whether a given administrative position is Chevron-eligible
334
on whether the position has "force of law" status.
Thus, the nuance. If a regulation has force of law status, it should not be a
consistency trigger. The IRS surely should lose the case, but it should lose on
the right ground. To the extent the regulation is law and the IRS's position is
contrary to it, the IRS should lose because its position is contrary to law, not
because it is inconsistent. Whenever possible, the focus should be on 3the
35
substance of the law, not on the nature of the IRS's application of the law.
For example, the Woods Investment case involved application of Treasury's
"consolidated return" regulations .33 6 These are specific-authority regulations, 3 37
and unquestionably possess force-of-law status.33 The IRS's position in the
case was contrary to the regulations . 339 The tax court properly held for the
taxpayer and used the correct rationale. The court applied the regulation as
written, binding law, 340 rather than invoke a consistency rationale.
Accordingly, the proposal would designate only those regulations without
the force of law as consistency triggers. There is no need for a comparable
nuance for revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices. At one time, the
331. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 568 F.3d 675,
679 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Steve R. Johnson, Swallows Holding: Chevron's Growing
Traction in Tax, A.B.A. SEC. OF TAx'N NEWS Q., Summer 2008, at 1.
332. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96, 180-81 (2006) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (listing the circuit views for deference to general-authority regulations), rev'd, 515
F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
333. See, e.g., Mark E. Berg,JudicialDeference to Tax Regulations:A Reconsiderationin
Light ofNational Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481,49091 (2008); Vorris J. Blankenship, Determining the Validity of Tax Regulation-Uncertainties
Persist, 107 J. TAX'N 205, 206-09 (2007) (discussing the progression of the deference
standards); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Tax Court Ruling in Swallows Holding Demonstrates
Uncertainty in StandardofReview for Interpretive Versus Legislative Regulations,BNA DAILY
TAx REP.,

Mar. 20, 2006, at J-1.

334. E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165-66 (2007); Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
335. Thus, for example, the courts are reluctant to "look behind" an IRS notice of
deficiency to fathom the IRS's motives but instead look to the notice itself as the legally
significant statement. E.g., Greenberg's Express, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 324,327-30 (1974).
336. Woods Inv. Co. v. Conim'r, 85 T.C. 274, 277 (1985).
337. See I.R.C. §§ 1501-1502 (2006).
338. Woods Investment, 85 T.C. at 279 (citing Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 790,
801-02 (1975)).
339. Woods Investment, 85 T.C. at 256, acq., 1986-12 I.R.B. 26 (noting that the IRS
disagreed with Woods Investment but did not appeal the decision and no longer advanced its
position pending a change in regulations).
340. Id. at 282; see also CSI Hydrostatic Testers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 398,403-07,
410 (1994) (following Woods Investment on a similar issue).
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Chevron-eligibilityof revenue rulings and revenue procedures was seriously
debated .34 ' By now, however, very few cases have held that these
pronouncements have force-of-law status,3 4 and the current authority of those
prior decisions is doubtful. 4 It is essentially settled that revenue rulings and
revenue procedures lack force-of-law status.3
A second nuance would involve a cut-off date or event for relief from
interest liability. If the amendment provided for relief without a time restriction,
taxpayers would have an incentive to protract their proceedings as long as
possible, and to drag out administrative appeals, tax court litigation, 4 and
circuit court appeals. If interest were not accruing, the taxpayers would
essentially have an interest-free loan from the Government in the amount of the
deficiency throughout the pendency of prceins 4
Thus, relief from interest liability should cease as of some time or event.
Candidate cut-off dates could be the date that the IRS issues a notice of
deficiency or assesses the tax in question, 347 or a stated number of days after
this issuance or assessment .348 Another alternative for the cut-off event could be
341. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings
in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35, 79-88 (1995). Compare Paul L. Caron, Tax
Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of IncreasedJudicialDeference to Revenue
Rulings, 57 OH1o ST. L.J. 637 (1996), and Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let
Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAx REv. 517 (1994) (both criticizing the
,'myopic view" that tax law is separate from other areas of law), with Linda Galler, Judicial
Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling DivergentStandards, 56 OHmo Sr. L.J. 1037, 1040
(1995), and Linda Galler, Emerging Standardsfor JudicialReview of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72
B.U. L. REV. 841, 844 (1992) (both arguing that Congress should prohibit the application of
Chevron and Davis deference to revenue rulings).
342. See, e.g., Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 977 (6th Cir. 1993).
343. See, e.g., Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 180-82 (6th Cir. 2003)
(questioning the continuing validity of Johnson City).
344. See, e.g., Irving Salem, Ellen P. Aproll & Linda Galler, ABA Section of Taxation
Report of the Task Force on JudicialDeference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 768-72 (2004).
345. Taxpayers may litigate in tax court without paying the deficiency asserted by the IRS.
In contrast, full payment usually is a jurisdictional prerequisite for litigating in district court or
the Court of Federal Claims. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960).
346. A taxpayer pursuing this strategy would want to consider I.R.C. §6673(a)(l), which
allows the tax court to impose damages on taxpayers who institute or maintain proceedings that
are frivolous, groundless, or primarily for delay. See also FED. R. App. P. 38 (allowing courts of
appeals to penalize parties bringing frivolous appeals). However, § 6673 is used almost
exclusively against tax protesters. It is not a deterrent to a taxpayer who has a reasonably
arguable position.
347. The IRS cannot legally collect a tax until it has been assessed. I.R.C. §§ 6201-6203,
6303, 6321, 6331 (2006). In general, before it can legally assess deficiencies in income, gift,
estate, and certain kinds of excise taxes, the IRS must issue a notice of deficiency, which
triggers the opportunity for tax court review. I.R.C. §§ 6211-6213 (2006).
348. For instance, abatement of interest could end twenty-one days after the date of notice
and demand for payment, which would coordinate with the date interest begins to run on unpaid
tax penalties. See I.R.C. § 6601 (e)(2) (2006).
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when the IRS first contacts the taxpayer in writing regarding the alleged
deficiency. This event is already used with respect to interest abatement under §
6404(e)( 1).14 9 However, within reasonable limits, the setting of any cut-off date
or event is more important than the precise date or event that is chosen.
The amendment adopting this proposal would further provide-either
expressly in the statute or in accompanying legislative history 3 5 -that interest
abatement and other statutory mechanisms ~'are the sole remedies available to
taxpayers for IRS inconsistency. In particular, it would state that inconsistency
may not be a ground on which a reviewing court rejects the principal amount of
the deficiency asserted by the IRS.
For example, assume that the IRS has determined a deficiency of $600 and
that the interest thereon through the cut-off date is $500. In this situation, a
successful inconsistency defense would relieve the taxpayer of liability for the
$500, but not liability for the $600. It also would not relieve the taxpayer of
liability for any interest accruing after the cut-off date.
C. Measuring the ProposalAgainst the Criteriaof Effectiveness
1. In General
The new statutory solution must have enough "punch" that it has a
noticeable impact on the IRS and relieves or compensates the aggrieved
taxpayer to a meaningfuil degree. And yet, the response must avoid unduly
complicating sound tax administration. The proposal strikes an appropriate
balance between these conflicting values.
The proposed solution would both sting the IRS and meaningfully help the
taxpayer. Interest can accumulate to large amounts due to the many years that
can elapse between the filing of the original tax return and the payment of the
deficiency. 52 Taxpayers' representatives encounter many cases in practice
where the interest nearly equals or even exceeds the deficiency by the time the
case is resolved. Accordingly, not receiving the interest would be a blow to the

349. Id.
350. For recent exploration of the extent to which the Supreme Court adverts to legislative
history in tax cases, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58
DuKE L.J. 1231 (2009).
351. Such as fee shifting under I.R.C. § 7430. See discussion supra note 2.
352. For example, in one case, the IRS asserted income tax deficiencies for 1982 throughi
1988 for the taxpayer's law practice. Alfaro v. Comin'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 661, 662 (2002),
affd, 349 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2003). The parties settled the case in 1995, and the taxpayer paid
the liabilities in 1996. Id Included in the liabilities the taxpayer paid $1,527,695 in accrued
interest on the deficiencies. Id.; see also Kikalos v. Comni'r, 190 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cu. 1999)
(finding $393,000 in interest on a deficiency of about $558,000); Allen v. United States, 173
F.3d 533, 535 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding $500,000 of interest on a deficiency of about $542,000).
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IRS, and not having to pay the interest would be meaningful relief to the
taxpayer.
Significantly, however, the proposed solution would not overcorrect the
problem. Taxpayers would get an excessive benefit-a windfall-if
inconsistency defeated the entire adjustment, including the deficiency. Had the
taxpayer correctly followed the law upon initially filing their return they would
have paid more tax than they did. That "more" is the amount of the deficiency.
Typically, when a taxpayer detrimentally relies on an erroneous prior IRS
position and then has to pay up, all the taxpayer really is "out"-compared to a
correct initial filing-is the interest paid on the deficiency. 3 53 Thus, relief from
that interest is what a reasonable remedy would provide.
To take a parallel, "investors" disappointed in tax shelters often sue the
shelter promoters when the desired tax benefits do not materialize. Some courts
hold that damages recoverable in these suits do not include the back taxes the
investors paid to the IRS when the scheme came a cropper .35 t4 The rationale is
that, had they not participated in the shelter and claimed tax benefits from it,
the investors "would still have had to pay the taxes in question, based on their
overall income situation. The fact that they ultimately did so does not suggest
355
that they suffered an out-of-pocket 'loss' as a result of their investment.
Allowing shelter investors to recover damages on account of their tax
deficiencies would amount to windfalls, and allowing victims of IRS
inconsistency to avoid their deficiencies would result in windfalls as well.
Relief from interest liability is a more appropriately tailored remedy.
Furthermore, as a "weak duty" approach, the proposed solution would
entail fewer disadvantages than more extreme remedies. The proposed solution
would apply only to inconsistency with regulations, revenue rulings, revenue
procedures, and notices, and it would relieve the taxpayer only of interest (not
353. The taxpayer is not out even the deficiency if he or she invested the tax saving
between the time of the original return and the time of payment of the tax liabilities, thereby
generating investment earnings. I would ignore that fact. Americans typically spend their tax
refuinds, not invest them; however, investment might be the norm for wealthy individuals and
corporations. On that basis, a case could be made for limiting the proposed relief based on net
worth or similar criteria. For example, wealthy individuals and large entities already are
excluded from the fee-shifting and burden-of-proof reversal provisions in the Code. See I.R.C.
§§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), 749 1(a)(2)(C) (2006); Steve R. Johnson, A Modest Proposalto Imp rove
Tax Compliance: Means-Testing the "Reliance" Penalty Defense, 10 FLA. TAx REX'.
(forthcoming 20 10) (describing present means-tested features of the tax law and proposing their
extension). Although a limitation of this kind has some appeal, I would omit it from the
proposed statutory provision to promote simplicity.
354. E.g., 3 RONALD E.MALLEN &JEFFREY M. SmrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTIcE 681 (2008 ed.);
Jacob L. Todres, Tax MalpracticeDamages:A Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the
Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 7 12-22 (2008).
355. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Ducote Jax Holdings LLC v. Bradley, 335 F. App'x 392, (5th Cir. 2009) (not selected for
publication) (noting that damages not awarded where taxpayer did not show his tax assessment
would have otherwise been deviated or eliminated).
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the deficiency) and only in cases of reliance. As a result, the solution would
avoid or reduce problems identified in Part L-V.B. Specifically, these
shortcomings will be negated in the following ways:
(1) Because deficiencies would still be recoverable, courts would still need
to consider the substantive merits, 3 _preserving their contributions to
development of the substantive tax law. 5
(2) The willingness of the IRS to issue guidance at levels below revenue
rulings and revenue procedures would not be chilled by the fear that this
guidance could hurt the IRS in other cases. There likely would be little chilling
for regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices as well-first
because the bite (loss of interest but not deficiencies) would be moderated, and,
second, because these types of rules and guidance already are subject to

multiple levels of review within Treasury and the

IRS.11

(3) Less time and money would be expended during administrative appeals
and litigation on discovery "fishing expeditions" and other matters collateral to
the underlying merits because only the major types of pronouncements would
be consistency triggers and only taxpayers who could show reliance would
3
qualifyr for relief. 51

2. Sustainability
It would be a step forward if Congress were to enact this proposal or a
similar amendment, but enacted legislation is not impervious to the winds of
change. The sustainability question is pertinent to a statutory regime as well as
to a common law regime.
For example, many established and sound features of federal tax procedure
were modified-often unwisely-by one blow in 1998.~~One may take some
comfort in the fact that the 1998 legislation resulted from "perfect storm"
condition 's. The chair of the Senate Finance Committee was facing a difficult
reelection campaign, so he held sensational hearings; however, the testimony
was later largely discredited 36 0 to improve his visibility and popularity. The
nation was enjoying peace and prosperity, which led to "slow news days" for
the media to fill with coverage of the hearings. Also, the federal budget was
essentially in balance, so fears of revenue loss did not cool enthusiasm to
punish the IRS. The then Commissioner of Internal Revenue had been selected
because he was an outsider to the tax world. Thus, he lacked the knowledge
356. See supra text accompanying notes 247-80.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 242-47.
358. See supra text accompanying note 246.
359. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
360. See, e.g., Susan Meador Tobias, IRS Abuse Should Be a Two- Way Street, 79 TAX
NOTES 1071 (1998); Stephen Barr, Report Labels IRS Testimony "Unfounded, " WASH. POST,
Apr. 26, 1998, at A2.
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and confidence to refute inaccurate perceptions that were being treated as facts.
possible
The then President practiced a strategy of "triangulation" to preempt
36
campaign issues, so he joined the parade instead of opposing it. '
Perfect storms occur only rarely, but tax is a hot button political issue, so
another perfect storm cannot be ruled out. Is there reason to hope that a
statutory solution to the consistency problem could endure future misplaced
reformist zeal?
Of course, nothing can be guaranteed in politics, but two considerations
inspire cautious optimism. First, the solution proposed in this article pays much
more heed to the fairness consideration than does the "no duty" view. Indeed, it
relieves taxpayers as fully as fairness legitimately demands. Fairness requires
that taxpayers who reasonably relied on authoritative Treasury and IRS
guidance be held harmless to the extent they were harmed, and this proposal
accomplishes that objective. The IRS is punished; deserving taxpayers are
helped; but overcompensation and serious interference with tax administration
are avoided. No fortification is impregnable, but these are good ramparts from
which to defend a statutory provision. Second, even if a good statutory solution
were weakened by subsequent amendment, there would at least still be a single
controlling rule. An imperfect statute would have the advantage of uniformity
over the chaotic common law regime that currently prevails.
D. Consonance with the Evolving Interest Regime
This proposal reflects the significant evolution of the nature of interest
under the Internal Revenue Code. Originally, interest was conceived simply as
"4compensation for the use or forbearance of money., 362 Because of the
underpayment, the taxpayer had the use of money that the Government should
have had the use of, and payment of interest was the recompense therefor. 6
However, that original purpose has changed substantially over time. Moralistic
and pragmatic concerns have increasingly affected interest rules. Here are five
examples:

(1) Until eliminated in

1989,364

former Code § 662 1(c) provided for an

increased interest rate for deficiencies attributable to "tax motivated
361. For discussion of the 1998 legislation, see Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as
InquisitorialProcess and the PartialParadigmShi in the IRS RestructuringandReform Act
of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1, 78-132 (2004); Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation,
supra note 187, at 446-57.
362. E.g., Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,498 (1940); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF
TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE 41, 44, 128, 136 (1999), quotedin LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA,

TAx CONTRaOVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

509 (3d ed. 2009).

363. E.g., Avon Prods., Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 342, 343 (2d Cir. 1978).
364. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, sec. 6665(b),
§ 6621(c), 103 Stat. 2106, 2399.
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transactions," i.e., tax shelters.365 Extra interest was, in essence, an additional
penalty.
(2) Current Code § 662 1(c) provides for a 2% higher interest rate for large
underpayments by corporations. 36 6 The Government's economic loss is no

greater because of the taxpayer's identity,367 so the best explanation for this
differential is to afford additional deterrence against corporations trying to
"game" the tax system or to penalize them if they do.
(3) From the mid- 1980's until 1998, the rate of interest paid by taxpayers
to the Government on account of tax underpayments was 1%higher than the
rate paid by the Government to taxpayers on account of tax overpayments. 368
This was purely fiscally driven, a sneaky attempt to try to reduce the budget
deficit.
(4) There already are some interest abatement provisions in the Code. For
example, the IRS may abate interest when ministerial or managerial acts on its
part result in unreasonable delay in concluding a case,3 6 when the IRS waits
too long in starting or ending an audit, 37 0 when the IRS gave erroneous written
advice on which the taxpayer reasonably relied,3 7 or when there has been a
filing extension because the taxpayer is in a presidentially declared disaster

area.37
(5) A bill considered by Congress in 2000, but not enacted, would have
gone further than current abatement provisions. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights
2000373

was passed by the House but died in the Senate .3 74 Section 104 of the

bill would have expanded the IRS 's authority to abate interest, including for
situations of "gross injustice," non-ministerial IRS delay, and reliance on a

365. I.R.C. § 662 1(c) (1988) (repealed 1989).
366. I.R.C. §662 1(c) (2006).
367. However, the taxpayer's investment gain may vary by identity: sometimes
corporations can get a better rate of return than individuals. Then again, some corporations have
made some pretty dumb investments.
368. I.R.C. § 6621(a)(1)(B), 2(b) (1998) (§6621(a)(1)(B) repealed by Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3302(a), 112 Stat. 685,
741).
369. I.R.C. § 6404(e) (2006). This means things like misplacing the file so a bill cannot be
mailed or a payment cannot be posted. It is clear that § 6404(e)(1) does not cover policy
decisions or litigating positions taken by the IRS. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-2(b) (1998);
Nelson v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 958, 960 (2004) ("There can be no abuse of
discretion ...for failure to abate interest if the statute that applies does not give the
Commissioner discretion to abate the interest.").
370. I.R.C. § 6404(g) (2006).
371. I.R.C. § 6404(f).
372. I.R.C. § 7508A(a)(2).
373. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2000, H.R. 4163, 106th Cong. (2000).
374. See The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:H1R04163
:@@@X (last visited April 26, 2010).
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written statement by the IRS that was in response to a specific written request
from a taxpayer. 7
As the foregoing demonstrates, the interest rules have moved far beyond
the original compensatory purpose. Interest is now viewed as a fit vehicle to
punish or deter bad acts by taxpayers or by the IRS, as well as to further other
purposes, both fair and foul. Abatement of interest to compensate for IRS
positional inconsistency would be commensurate with the evolving nature of
the Code's interest rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
The status quo of a governmental duty of tax consistency is unsatisfactory.
Numerous thinly reasoned decisions have produced doctrinal chaos, which is
likely only to continue until a statutory solution is imposed.
The responses to IRS inconsistency that have been suggested in cases and
commentary thus far include a "strong duty" view, a "no duty" view, and
various "weak duty" views. Among these, the "no duty" view is the most
solvent as a technical, doctrinal matter. However, the power of fairness and
other considerations is such that the technically superior answer has proved
unsustainable. A new approach-meaningful, balanced, and thus hopefully
sustainable-is needed.
The statutory solution should provide meaningful sanctions and relief, but
not at the cost of undermining sound tax administration and stunting the
development of the substantive tax law. The solution that best balances these
competing values would entail abatement of interest on tax deficiencies when
the taxpayer relied on a then-effective regulation, revenue ruling, revenue
procedure, or notice and the IRS adjustment ran counter to that authority.
Beyond addressing the specific problem, the larger issues raised by this
article entail the role of common law making in taxation, the clash of fairness
and administrative necessity, and achieving sustainable reforms of the tax
system. I intend to continue to explore these "meta" themes in future articles,
and I look forward to the light that other scholars, practitioners, and jurists will
shine on them through their own work.

375.

H.R. 4163, § 104(a)-(b), (d).

